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ARTICLES

Deal Protection Devices
Albert H. Choi†
In mergers and acquisitions transactions, a buyer and a seller will often agree
to contractual mechanisms (deal protection devices) to deter third parties from
jumping the deal and to compensate a disappointed buyer. With the help of auction
theory, this Article analyzes various deal protection devices, while focusing on the
two most commonly used mechanisms: match rights and target termination fees. A
match right gives the buyer a right to “match” a third party’s offer so as to prevent
the third party from snatching the target away, while a termination fee compensates
the buyer when a third party acquires the target. Such mechanisms raise a number
of important corporate and contract law questions. How effective are they in preventing third parties from competing for the target? Do they steer the target to be sold
to a buyer who values the target less? Are the devices harmful to the target shareholders? To what extent can the negotiated deal price represent the target’s “fair
value” when such devices reduce or eliminate the competition? This Article shows,
foremost, that these devices can actually increase the target and buyer’s joint return
and possibly the target’s stand-alone return. Match rights and termination fees function quite differently, however. While a large termination fee reduces the target’s
stand-alone return and can lead to allocative inefficiency, an unlimited match right
increases the target’s stand-alone return and promotes allocative efficiency. This
Article argues that answering the corporate law questions ultimately turns on the
question of how and why the target directors are utilizing the devices. If the devices
are being deployed with the objective of maximizing the target shareholders’ return,
not only can they be beneficial for the target shareholders, but their presence can
also make the deal price a more reliable indicator of the target’s fair value. With an
improper objective, not only do the devices undermine target shareholders’ return,
but the court also should not use the deal price as evidence of fair value. This Article
also analyzes stock and asset lockups and examines deal protection devices through
the lens of contract law.

† Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank workshop participants at the law schools of Columbia University, University of Michigan, and
University of Southern California; conference participants at the 2018 Trans-Pacific Business Law Conference and the 2020 Winter Deals Conference; and particularly Dhruv Aggarwal, Adam Badawi, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Joel Friedlander, Jeff Gordon, Michael
Knoll, Vice Chancellor Travis Laster, Brian Quinn, and Bob Scott for many helpful comments and suggestions. Comments are welcome to alchoi@umich.edu.
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INTRODUCTION
On April 12, 2018, two wholesale office supply companies,
Genuine Parts Corporation (GPC) and Essendant, Inc., agreed to
combine their office supply businesses in order to better compete
against e-commerce sellers, such as Amazon.com, Inc.1 The agreement contained several deal protection measures for GPC.2 The
1
See Genuine Parts Co. v. Essendant, Inc., No. 2018-0730-JRS, 2019 WL 4257160,
at *1 (Del. Ch. 2019); In re Essendant, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 2018-0789-JRS, 2019 WL
7290944, at *2 (Del. Ch. 2019).
2
See Essendant Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger, Dated as of April 12, 2018, by
and Among Genuine Parts Company, Rhino SpinCo, Inc., Essendant Inc. and Elephant
Merger Sub Corp. 53–56, 79, A-12 (Form 10-Q, Exhibit 10.5) (Apr. 25, 2018) [hereinafter
GPC-Essendant Merger Agreement].
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first was a nonsolicitation (“no-shop”) provision that prohibited
Essendant from directly soliciting a third-party offer but that
nonetheless allowed Essendant to negotiate with a third party in
case an unsolicited, superior offer3 were made (a “fiduciary out”).4
The second was a match right: in the case that a third party made
an unsolicited superior offer, Essendant was obligated to negotiate in “good faith” for three days with GPC so as to give GPC an
opportunity to beat the third party’s offer.5 The match right was
unlimited: whenever a third party revised its offer or another
party made an offer, a new three-day period would start.6 The
third was a termination fee, which required Essendant to pay
$12 million to GPC in the case that Essendant decided to merge
with a third party.7
The merger was structured in such a way that the shareholders
of GPC were to receive Essendant stock in return for their ownership interest in GPC’s office supply business.8 Because Essendant had to issue a large amount of stock, Essendant had to
schedule a special meeting of its shareholders to receive their approval.9 Before Essendant was able to get the approval, however,
a private equity firm, Sycamore (which owned Staples, another
3

The agreement defined “Superior Proposal” as
a written bona fide offer or proposal made by a third party . . . on terms and
conditions that the [Essendant board] determines, in its good faith judgment,
after consulting with a financial advisor of internationally recognized reputation
and external legal counsel, and taking into account all legal, financial and regulatory and other aspects of the proposal, including availability of financing, and
any changes to the terms of this Agreement proposed by GPC in response to such
offer or proposal, or otherwise, to be (a) more favorable from a financial point of
view, to the stockholders of [Essendant] than the Merger and (b) reasonably expected to be consummated.

Id. at A-12 to -13.
4
See id. § 7.03(a), at 53 (nonsolicitation provision); id. § 7.03(c), at 54 (fiduciary out).
5
See id. § 7.03(d), at 54–56.
6
See id. § 7.03(d)(ii)(2), at 56.
7
See GPC-Essendant Merger Agreement, supra note 2, § 9.03(a)(ii), at 79; id. at A-13.
8
The transaction was structured as a “spin merger”—specifically, a Reverse Morris
Trust transaction, see Young Ran Kim & Geeyoung Min, Insulation by Separation: When
Dual-Class Stock Met Corporate Spin-offs, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 11 (2019)—in which
GPC was to spin off its wholly owned subsidiary, S.P. Richards Co. (SPR), in the first step
and, in the second step, Essendant’s wholly owned subsidiary was to merge with SPR. In
order to receive the necessary tax benefits, the shareholders of GPC had to own more than
50% of the combined entity. See GPC-Essendant Merger Agreement, supra note 2, Recitals, at 1; id. art. II, at 2–5; see also Essendant Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 12, 2018).
9
See GPC-Essendant Merger Agreement, supra note 2, § 7.02, at 53. Under New
York Stock Exchange regulations, when a company issues more than 20% of its outstanding stock as part of a merger or an acquisition, the company has to receive its shareholders’
approval. See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.03 (2019).
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office supply company), made a competing offer on April 29, 2018,
of $11.50 per share for all of Essendant’s outstanding stock.10 Deciding that this offer was likely to be superior to the merger with
GPC, Essendant notified GPC, thereby triggering GPC’s threeday match right. While protesting that the offer from Sycamore
was not “[s]uperior,”11 GPC nonetheless decided to “match” the offer by increasing its consideration by about $4 per share.12 When
Sycamore came back with a sweetened offer, thereby triggering
another three-day match period, however, GPC declined to
match.13 On September 10, 2018, after some further negotiations,
Essendant accepted Sycamore’s final bid of $12.80, and upon the
termination of the agreement with GPC, GPC collected the
$12 million termination fee.14
While deal protection measures—such as no-shop clauses,
match rights, and termination fees, as seen in the GPC-Essendant
story—have been fairly common in mergers-and-acquisitions

10 See Genuine Parts, 2019 WL 4257160, at *4. While I am trying to use the GPCEssendant transaction as a motivating example, the actual story is a bit more complex. In
fact, Sycamore made an all-cash offer of $11.50 per share on April 17, 2018, and Essendant’s board initially determined that this earlier offer was not likely to lead to a superior proposal. On April 29, 2018, Sycamore made a “renewed” proposal at the same cash
amount of $11.50, but it also indicated that it might make a higher bid upon receiving
Essendant’s nonpublic information. This time, however, Essendant’s board concluded that
Sycamore’s new offer was reasonably likely to lead to a superior offer and notified GPC in
accordance, thereby triggering the first three-day match period. Id.
11 Id. While the cash offer from Sycamore was easy to value, valuing the consideration from SPR, GPC’s wholly owned subsidiary, was not as straightforward. Using a discounted cash flow analysis, GPC argued that the consideration offered by Sycamore was
significantly lower than the share price implied from the GPC-Essendant merger. Id.
12 Id. The $4 increase was not in the form of cash but was in the form of a “contingent
value right” that Essendant shareholders would be able to receive once stipulated contingencies had been satisfied. Id. Note here that after GPC matched Sycamore’s offer, Essendant did not have an obligation to accept GPC’s matching offer. Essendant was free to
propose GPC’s matching offer to Sycamore in the hopes of inducing Sycamore to sweeten
its proposal. This is an important difference from the conventional right of first refusal.
For a more detailed analysis and comparison, see infra Part III.B.1.
13 See In re Essendant, 2019 WL 7290944, at *4.
14 Id. Notwithstanding its acceptance of the $12 million termination fee, GPC has
brought suit against Essendant arguing, among other things, that Essendant breached its
contractual obligations, especially the nonsolicitation (no-shop) provisions. Genuine Parts,
2019 WL 4257160, at *9. Because the argument is based on a breach of the nonsolicitation
provision, GPC argued that it is entitled to full expectation damages. According to the
GPC-Essendant Merger Agreement, “in the event that the Termination Fee is paid in accordance with [ ] Section 9.03, the payment of the Termination Fee shall be the sole and
exclusive remedy of GPC.” GPC-Essendant Merger Agreement, supra note 2, § 9.03(e), at
81. On September 9, 2019, the Delaware Court of Chancery denied Essendant’s motion to
dismiss. See Genuine Parts, 2019 WL 4257160, at *11.
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transactions for quite some time,15 the law’s treatment of them
has gone through some significant changes. Judicial attitudes
toward deal protection devices can roughly be divided into three
periods: initial hostility during the active takeover period of
the late 1980s and early 1990s, followed by a more permissive
stance, and finally, the recent, renewed examination stemming
from appraisal cases.16 Initially, courts were quite unfavorable
to deal protection devices, as seen in the seminal cases, such
as Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,17 and
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.18 The
courts were concerned about whether agreeing to certain deal
protection devices would constitute a breach of the target directors’ fiduciary duties and also undermine the target shareholders’
return. In subsequent cases, however, such as In re Toys “R” Us,
15 The story of Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, Inc. (a car rental company), is also
quite instructive. On April 25, 2010, Dollar Thrifty and Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., entered into an agreement, pursuant to which Dollar Thrifty shareholders were entitled to
receive $41 per share (80% cash and 20% Hertz stock). See In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder
Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 592 (Del. Ch. 2010). The agreement contained, among other things, a
match right for Hertz. Id. at 593. A few days later, however, Avis Budget Group, Inc.,
made a competing offer of $46.50 per share (part cash and part stock). Id. at 594. Although
the size of the consideration seemed more attractive than the offer from Hertz, Dollar
Thrifty’s board determined that Avis’s offer did not constitute a “Superior Proposal” due,
in large part, to the concern over whether they will be able to get the necessary antitrust
approval on a timely basis and the fact that Avis did not offer any reverse termination fee.
Id. More recently, 21st Century Fox, Inc., declined to entertain an offer from Comcast
Corp. due to antitrust and lack of reverse termination fee concerns, even though Comcast’s
offer was higher than that of Walt Disney Co. See Shalini Ramachandran & Ben Fritz,
Fox Rejected Higher Comcast Bid Due to Antitrust Concerns, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://perma.cc/JHH8-8GZH; see also Afra Afsharipour, Transforming the Allocation of
Deal Risk Through Reverse Termination Fees, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1161, 1206–18 (2010) (examining the risk allocation role played by reverse termination fees); Albert Choi & George
Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119
YALE L.J. 848, 872–76, 922 (2010) (examining the role played by liquidated damages, such
as reverse termination fees, in mergers and acquisitions transactions); Brian J.M. Quinn,
Optionality in Merger Agreements, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 809–13, 824–27 (2010) (empirically comparing reverse termination fees with target termination fees and arguing that
symmetric termination fees may be inefficient); Albert H. Choi & Abraham Wickelgren,
Reverse Breakup Fees and Antitrust Approval 8–15 (May 25, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (analyzing the role played by reverse breakup fees in securing antitrust approval).
The shareholders of Dollar Thrifty later rejected the agreement with Hertz and the deal
fell apart. A few years later, Dollar Thrifty and Hertz managed to successfully complete
the new deal at a consideration of $87.50 for each Dollar Thrifty share. See Michael J. de
la Merced & Peter Lattman, After Long Pursuit, Hertz to Buy Dollar Thrifty for $2.3 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2012), https://perma.cc/RUD9-T57H.
16 See infra Part I for a more detailed review of the historical development over deal
protection devices.
17 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
18 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
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Inc. Stockholder Litigation,19 Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Co.20
(Lyondell I), and C & J Energy Services v. City of Miami General
Employees’ & Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust,21 the
courts took a much more permissive stance toward deal protection
devices.
Although the question whether agreeing to certain deal protection devices can constitute a breach of fiduciary duty has not
been fully resolved,22 the recent controversy over appraisal has
breathed new life into the subject. In an appraisal litigation, target
shareholders, who are dissenting to the merger, ask the court to
determine the “fair value” of the shares.23 One prominent issue
was whether the court could use the deal price itself as an indicator of fair value.24 In cases such as DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield
Value Partners,25 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund,26 and Verition Partners Master Fund v. Aruba Networks,27 the Delaware Supreme Court stated that when an acquisition is done at “arms’ length” and when there is sufficient
competition for the target, either before or after the agreement
has been signed, the deal price is a reliable indicator of the fair
value of the target’s shares.28 In determining whether a
19

877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005).
No. 3176–VCN, 2008 WL 2923427 (Del. Ch. 2008); see also Lyondell Chem. Co. v.
Ryan (Lyondell II), 970 A.2d 235, 243–44 (Del. 2009).
21 107 A.3d 1049, 1069–70 (Del. 2014).
22 Notwithstanding the general permissiveness toward deal protection devices in fiduciary duty cases, by no means is the debate over. Plaintiffs are still raising, and Delaware courts are still grappling with, the issue of whether entering into certain deal protection devices can constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. Skepticism against deal
protection devices gets especially heightened when there are other indicia that the target
directors may have breached their fiduciary duty. See, e.g., In re PLX Tech. Inc. S’holders
Litig., No. 9880-VCL, 2018 WL 5018535, at *44 (Del. Ch. 2018) (stating that when there
are “undisclosed conflicts of interest” among the directors, match rights and a 3.5% termination fee that are “otherwise reasonable” can trigger judicial skepticism); see also In re
MeadWestvaco S’holders Litig., 168 A.3d 675, 686–87 (Del. Ch. 2017); van der Fluit v.
Yates, No. 12553-VCMR, 2017 WL 5953514, at *10–11 (Del. Ch. 2017).
23 The controversy over appraisal stemmed, in large part, from the emergence of “appraisal arbitrage,” where institutional investors, such as hedge funds, would purchase the
target’s shares, sometimes even after the merger has been announced, primarily for the
purpose of exercising the appraisal remedy. For background information, see Albert H.
Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
543, 543–44 (2018).
24 Id.
25 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017).
26 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017).
27 210 A.3d 128 (Del. 2019).
28 DFC Global, 172 A.3d at 366 (noting that “the sale value resulting from a robust
market check will often be the most reliable evidence of fair value,” but declining to create
20
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transaction satisfies such a standard, the presence or the absence
of deal protection devices, not surprisingly, became a salient issue. For instance, in In re AOL Inc.,29 the Delaware Court of
Chancery declined to use the deal price to determine the fair
value when, among other things, the deal was subject to buyerfriendly deal protection measures, including an unlimited match
right.30
The line of cases from Revlon and Paramount v. QVC,
through In re Toys “R” Us and C & J Energy Services, and into
the recent appraisal cases such as In re AOL, raises interesting
and important questions about deal protection devices. When the
transacting parties (such as GPC and Essendant) are trying to
“lock up” the deal, to what extent are deal protection measures
successful in ensuring that a competing buyer (such as Sycamore)
will not try to “jump” the deal? How do they affect a third party’s
(Sycamore’s) incentive to compete? For instance, if the buyer
(GPC) has an unlimited match right, given that the buyer can
match a third party’s offer as many times as it desires, can this
substantially deter a third party (such as Sycamore) from competing against the buyer (GPC)?31 What if the target has an
a jurisprudential presumption to that effect); see also Dell, 177 A.3d at 35 (explaining that
the deal price should be given “heavy weight” when there is “evidence of market efficiency,
fair play, low barriers to entry, [and] outreach to all logical buyers”); Verition Partners,
210 A.3d at 138 (explaining that a deal price that is “informed by the efforts of arm’s length
buyers of the entire company” is “likely to be indicative of so-called fundamental value”).
29 No. 11204–VCG, 2018 WL 1037450 (Del. Ch. 2018).
30 Id. at *9 (finding that a deal price could not be used as a measure of fair value
because potential competing bidders would have been deterred by the no-shop provision
and “unlimited three-day matching rights,” evidence that the CEO had already committed
to the buyer, and informational disadvantages).
31 Professors Brian Quinn and Guhan Subramanian have argued, for instance, that
an unlimited match right can substantially exacerbate what’s known as the “winner’s
curse problem” and deter a competing buyer from emerging. See Fernán Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian, The New Look of Deal Protection, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1013, 1058–59
(2017) (“The match right [ ] fuels the classic ‘winner’s curse’ problem: in any scenario
where a third party bids and wins, it would know that a better-informed party (namely,
the first bidder) thought that the price was too high. Looking forward and reasoning back,
a third party is unlikely to bid.”); Brian J.M. Quinn, Re-Evaluating the Emerging Standard of Review for Matching Rights in Control Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1011, 1027
(2011) (stating that when there is a match right, “the second bidder risks falling victim to
the winner’s curse problem”). More recently, in a series of articles, Professor Subramanian
argues that “an exclusive pre-signing negotiation followed by a go-shop process in which
the buyer gets an unlimited match right would probably not qualify for deference to the
deal price.” Guhan Subramanian, Appraisal After Dell, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN
CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? 222, 226 (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall
Stuart Thomas eds., 2019); accord Guhan Subramanian & Annie Zhao, Go-Shops Revisited, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1215, 1275 (2020). This Article argues that a competition between

764

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:757

obligation to pay a large termination fee? From the target shareholders’ perspective, do the deal protection devices undercut their
return?32 Finally, in the context of an appraisal remedy, does the
presence of deal protection devices undermine the reliability of
the deal price as an indicator of fair value? Should the presence
of an unlimited match right, for instance, make the deal price unreliable evidence?33 What factors do we need to consider in answering these questions?
This Article analyzes deal protection devices,34 focusing, in
particular, on match rights and termination fees, with the help of
multiple buyers when the inside buyer has a match right should be thought of as replicating an English auction, and in that setting, the winner’s curse problem is unlikely to arise.
And this will be true even when the inside bidder has an informational advantage vis-àvis outside bidders. For a more general discussion of the winner’s curse problem in auctions, see infra Part III.D.
32 Some practitioners and jurists have argued that deal protection measures are necessary to entice the initial buyer to undertake costly due diligence and to make a bid,
working as a compensation mechanism. By inducing the initial buyer to make a proposal,
the devices can increase target shareholders’ value. See Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d
43, 45 (Del. 1997); In re Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 1017; see also Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1539, 1546–47
(1996) (arguing that lockups can incentivize a potential buyer to participate in a bidding
competition); Yeon-Koo Che & Tracy R. Lewis, The Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests,
38 RAND J. ECON. 648, 660–62 (2007) (analytically examining the circumstances under
which lockups can facilitate the emergence of a bidder); Restrepo & Subramanian, supra
note 31, at 1018. Although this may be true, unless a lost opportunity cost (which is presumed to be difficult to estimate) is quite high, a better mechanism in dealing with this
may be through an expense reimbursement provision (or some measure of reliance damages).
By generously compensating the disappointed buyer with various expenses (including financial and legal advisor fees), expense reimbursement can function relatively well to
compensate the buyer. Also, such a rationale seems to be weak with respect to a match
right, especially when a termination fee provision is present.
33 See, e.g., Subramanian, supra note 31, at 226 (stating that “an exclusive pre-signing negotiation followed by a go-shop process in which the buyer gets an unlimited match
right would probably not qualify for deference to the deal price”).
34 About thirty years ago, Professor Ian Ayres started a heated debate on deal protection devices with his provocative thesis that moderately sized stock lockups generate
no allocative inefficiency. See Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups: Do Target Treasury Sales
Foreclose or Facilitate Takeover Auctions?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 682, 696–97 (1990). Numerous scholars have since then analytically and empirically examined the impact of various
deal protection devices. See, e.g., Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking
Lockups, 103 YALE L.J. 1739, 1803–04 (1994); David A. Skeel, Jr., A Reliance Damages
Approach to Corporate Lockups, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 564, 572–80 (1996); Kahan & Klausner,
supra note 32, at 1546–64; John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model
of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 314–37 (2000); Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1963–
70 (2003); Che & Lewis, supra note 32, at 650–63; Shmuel Leshem, A Signaling Theory of
Lockups in Mergers, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45, 53–54, 60–61 (2012); Steven M. Davidoff
& Christina M. Sautter, Lock-up Creep, 38 J. CORP. L. 681, 686–89, 695–98 (2013). All the
formal analyses of deal protection devices, except for Che & Lewis, supra note 32, and
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auction theory.35 The initial judicial hostility was against stock
and asset lockups, but such deal protection devices are being used
much less frequently, while termination fees and match rights
have become quite prevalent.36 This Article foremost argues that,
while deal protection devices can impede the target from being
sold to the buyer with a higher valuation (i.e., they can generate
allocative inefficiency), they can also increase the joint profit of
the target and the inside buyer (the beneficiary of deal protection
measures).37 Termination fees and match rights function quite
Leshem, supra, however, assume (expressly or implicitly) that the inside buyer (beneficiary of the deal protection device) and outside buyers are symmetrically informed of the
respective valuations or only informally discuss the possibilities of private information.
When we move away from the symmetric information assumption, important differences
emerge among various deal protection devices. Also, as far as I am aware, this is the first
Article to more formally analyze match rights using auction theory. Finally, when deal
practitioners speak of deal protection devices or lockups, they also include many other
mechanisms, such as no-shop (or go-shop) clauses, standstill agreements, information
rights, and voting agreements. See, e.g., Davidoff & Sautter, supra, at 682, 711 (discussing
a variety of lockups and arguing that the courts should broaden their analysis to other
types of lockups). For the sake of brevity, this Article shies away from discussing these
other mechanisms.
35 Auction theory has been used to analyze acquisitions and takeovers for quite some
time. See generally Alan Schwartz & Peter Cramton, Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 27 (1991); Che & Lewis, supra note 32; Choi & Talley,
supra note 23.
36 According to Professors Lou Kling, Eileen Nugent, and Brandon Van Dyke, stock
and asset lockups “have become [virtually] non-existent: asset lock-ups, because they generally fail the test of not unduly impeding the ability of third parties to make competing
bids, and stock [lock-ups] because of the limitations placed on the economics of deal protection devices by the case law and the elimination of pooling accounting.” 1 LOU R. KLING,
EILEEN T. NUGENT & BRANDON A. VAN DYKE, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES,
SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS § 4.04[6][b], at 4-93 (1992 & Supp. 2019) (citations omitted);
see also Coates & Subramanian, supra note 34, at 356–57 (analyzing the tax difference for
the first and second bidder); Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 34, at 686–87 (documenting
the rise of match rights); Restrepo & Subramanian, supra note 31, at 1023, 1031–32 (showing that “match rights have gone from approximately 60% of deals in 2003 to virtually
100% of deals by 2015” among public company targets with deal value of $50 million or
more); Subramanian & Zhao, supra note 31, at 1226–29 (demonstrating that in a recent
sample of private equity acquisitions, 100% of the deals had a match right). It is not entirely clear, however, why asset and stock lockups, in general, would be unduly impeding
third parties, particularly when compared to a large termination fee. With respect to an
asset lockup, an important difference is that the valuations of physical assets may differ
among buyers. For a stock lockup, unlike a fixed termination fee, the size of the compensation for the disappointed buyer depends directly on how much an outside buyer pays for
the target. These differences, along with their implications, are more closely examined in
Part III.E.
37 In a seminal work, Professors Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton showed how a
supply contract with a termination fee can allow an existing seller and a buyer to erect a
barrier against entry and also to extract rent from a more efficient entrant. Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, Contracts as a Barrier to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388, 391 (1987).
There are many other areas where a bilateral contract can be used to extract rent from a
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differently, however. Both a sizable termination fee and an unlimited match right can increase the joint return of the target and
the inside buyer, but a large termination fee is likely to generate
allocative inefficiency, while an unlimited match can actually promote allocative efficiency. Furthermore, in order to boost the target’s
stand-alone return, a large termination fee requires a price concession from the inside buyer (i.e., a higher deal price) while an
unlimited match will likely increase the target’s stand-alone return even without a price concession.
The basic insight can be explained as follows: With a termination fee, the target has to pay a fee in order to accept a more
attractive offer from a third party. This not only forces a third
party to pay more for the target (i.e., the size of pie gets bigger),
but a chunk of that additional payment flows to the inside buyer
as the promised fee. As the termination fee gets larger, the target’s return gets further depressed while the inside buyer enjoys
a higher return. In order for the target to share that additional
return, therefore, the target needs to receive a concession from
the inside buyer through a higher deal price. The story is different
with a match right. When a match right is limited (i.e., the inside
buyer has an option to match a third party’s offers only a few
times), given that there are no equivalent limitations on thirdparty buyers and the target is not obligated to accept the buyer’s
matched offer, this puts the inside buyer at a competitive disadvantage. With this uneven competition, the target’s return will be
lower. When the match right is unlimited, by contrast, there will
be more even competition between the inside buyer and thirdparty buyers. Furthermore, unlike a termination fee, the higher
proceeds go directly to the target, thereby increasing the target’s
stand-alone return.
The primary setting utilized in this Article is that of a “private value” auction, in which each buyer knows how much it is
willing to pay for the target. This Article also looks at the possibility of the “winner’s curse” problem in an interdependent valuation setting, where each buyer does not know—but only gets a
signal about—how much it is willing to pay for the target. An interdependent valuation setting does create the possibility of the
“winner’s curse” problem, and this is likely to happen either when
noncontracting third party. See, e.g., Albert Choi, Golden Parachute as a CompensationShifting Mechanism, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 170, 173–74 (2004) (explaining that golden
parachutes benefit both executives and shareholders because “the burden of takeover compensation is partly born[e] by the buyer through a higher purchase price”).

2021]

Deal Protection Devices

767

there is a sizable termination fee or with a limited match right.
With a sizable termination fee, a third-party buyer is forced to
make a “jump” bid, a bid that is substantially higher than the deal
price. Similarly, a limited match right forces the inside buyer to
make a jump bid so as to preempt a third party’s follow-up bid.
When concerned about the possibility of overpaying for the target,
the bidder who is forced to make a jump bid may decline to participate. By contrast, when there is no (or a small) termination fee
or when the match right is unlimited, even in an interdependent
valuation setting, the “winner’s curse” problem is unlikely to
arise. This Article then briefly extends the analysis to the scenario where the inside buyer has an informational advantage visà-vis third-party buyers, and it also examines stock and asset
lockups.
Based on these findings, this Article argues that answering
the questions (1) whether deal protection devices can maximize
target shareholders’ return and (2) whether their presence undermines the reliance on deal price as an indicator of fair value in
appraisal proceedings ultimately depends on whether the target
directors (and managers) are properly incentivized to maximize
the target shareholders’ return. If they are, termination fees and
match rights can be utilized to enhance the return for the target
shareholders. Furthermore, with the proper incentives in place,
compared to the case without any deal protection measures, the
deal price would be higher for the target shareholders, which, in
turn, increases the confidence with which the court can use the
deal price as evidence of fair value.38 At the opposite end of the
incentive spectrum, when the target directors (and managers) are
pursuing their own private gains at the expense of the target
shareholders (e.g., when they are conflicted), such devices can be
used to harm target shareholders, and the court should no longer
rely on the deal price to determine the fair value of the target’s
shares.
This Article also examines deal protection devices from the
perspective of contract law. Foremost, given that the devices can
undermine competition between the inside buyer and a third
party, under contract law, the court can inquire into whether they
should be struck down as imposing “unreasonable” restraints on
38 This statement should not, however, be construed as a wholesale endorsement of
using the deal price as evidence of fair value. There could be many reasons to suspect that
the deal price, even as a product of an arm’s-length negotiation, would not protect the
interest of the target shareholders. See generally Choi & Talley, supra note 23.
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trade (or, more broadly, being against public policy). This type of
reasoning has been used to cut down onerous noncompete
clauses39 and unreasonably large liquidated damages. This Article argues that such a public policy concern is higher with a large
termination fee than with an unlimited match right. So long as
the termination fee is relatively small (i.e., less than the expected
return for the inside buyer under the deal terms), it does not engender any allocative inefficiency. A large termination fee, by contrast, raises the specter of unduly undermining the competition
between the inside buyer and a third party and steering the target
to be sold to the initial buyer even when the initial buyer values
the target less. An unlimited match right, by contrast, actually
promotes more competition. This Article discusses factors that
the court can utilize in determining whether a termination fee is
“unreasonably” large.
This Article is organized as follows: Part I offers a brief overview of the case law, focusing primarily on corporate law cases
that examine deal protection devices. The overview starts from
the seminal hostile takeover cases of Revlon and Paramount v.
QVC and ends with very recent appraisal cases: DFC Global, Dell,
Aruba, and their progeny (including AOL, In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Group,40 and In re Stillwater Mining Co.41).
Part II shows how match rights and termination fees are deployed in practice. To aid the discussion, Part II looks at actual
acquisition agreements used in recent transactions, including
Nexstar Media Group’s acquisition of Tribune Media and Google
LLC’s acquisition of Fitbit Inc. Part III presents an auction theory–
based analysis to examine various deal protection mechanisms,
including termination fees, match rights, and stock and asset
lockups. Part III demonstrates how certain devices can be used to
maximize the target and initial buyer’s joint return by allowing
the target and the initial buyer to extract surplus from a potential
third-party buyer. The analysis is laid out with the help of numerical examples. The numerical examples will highlight how
match rights function differently from termination fees, and also
how stock and asset lockups will likely generate allocative

39 See generally ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN
LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS AND FREE RIDING (2013); Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman,
The Case for Noncompetes, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 953 (2020).
40 No. 12736-VCL, 2019 WL 3778370 (Del. Ch. 2019).
41 No. 2017-0385-JTL, 2019 WL 3943851 (Del. Ch. 2019).
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inefficiency. Part IV, applying the analysis from Part III, discusses
possible implications in both corporate and contract law.
I. A BRIEF CASE LAW HISTORY OF DEAL PROTECTION DEVICES
This Part offers a brief overview of the cases that address deal
protection devices in mergers and acquisitions. The overview is
divided into two clusters. The first starts with the hostile takeover cases in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the courts’ examination of deal protection devices in the context of satisfying
target directors’ (and managers’) fiduciary duties. This line of
cases ends with more recent permissive approaches that can be
seen through cases such as Lyondell Chemical and C & J Energy
Services. The other line of cases deals with the more recent controversy over appraisal litigation and how the courts have attempted to decide whether the presence of certain deal protection
devices undermined the desirability of using the deal price itself
as an indicator of fair value. The primary focus will be on the Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions in DFC Global, Dell, and Aruba,
and how the Delaware Court of Chancery has applied the principles in later cases.
A. Fiduciary Duty Cases
The dispute and controversy over deal protection devices
came to the fore during the hostile takeover era of the late 1980s
and the early 1990s. The cases primarily focused on whether
agreeing to certain deal protection measures led to a breach of
fiduciary duties by the target directors. As evidenced by cases
such as Revlon and Paramount v. QVC, the target and buyer corporations attempted to exclude possible third-party bidders using
deal protection devices, sometimes along with a poison pill. The
devices that attracted the most attention were stock and asset
lockups and termination fees. In Revlon, for instance, in order to
thwart a hostile takeover attempt by MacAndrews & Forbes,
Revlon (the target) brought in Forstmann Little (a private equity
shop) as a “white knight” defender while promising, among other
things, an asset lockup that allowed Forstmann Little to acquire
some of Revlon’s most valuable businesses at a below-market
price in case Forstmann Little was unable to acquire Revlon.42 In
42 Under the asset lockup provision of the agreement, if a third party acquired 40%
or more of Revlon’s stock, Forstmann Little would be entitled “to purchase Revlon’s Vision
Care and National Health Laboratories divisions for $525 million, some $100–175 million
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Paramount, favoring Viacom Inc. over QVC Network Inc. as the deal
partner, Paramount Communications Inc. (the target) promised
Viacom a right to acquire Paramount stock at a below-market
price (a stock lockup) in case Viacom was unable to close the
transaction.43 Viacom could also collect a $100 million termination fee.44 In both cases, the Delaware Supreme Court viewed the
deal protection devices quite harshly, ultimately forcing the target
corporations to eliminate them and try to run a fair auction
among the buyers.45
The height of judicial hostility against deal protection devices
was represented by the case of Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare,
Inc.46 The Delaware Supreme Court, in that case, struck down a
combination of deal protection devices, including a no-shop
clause, a termination fee, and a force-the-vote provision (which
did not have a fiduciary out termination right) as breaching the
fiduciary duties of NCS Healthcare’s (the target’s) directors.47

below the value ascribed to them by Lazard Freres” (Revlon’s financial advisor). See
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. Part III.E.2 analyzes asset lockups in more detail and shows how
an asset lockup, to the extent that it reduces an outside buyer’s reservation value more
than an inside buyer’s reservation value (due, for instance, to the loss of synergy value),
is more problematic than other deal protection devices, not only because it can engender
allocative inefficiency but also because it is quite unlikely to allow the target to increase
its return from sale.
43 Paramount, 637 A.2d at 39.
44 See id. There were three important deal protection devices used in the deal. First
was the no-shop provision. Second was the termination fee of $100 million, which would
be triggered if (a) there were a competing transaction; (b) Paramount shareholders rejected the merger; or (c) the Paramount board recommended a competing transaction.
Third was the stock option agreement, under which Viacom had an option to purchase
about 19.9% of Paramount’s outstanding stock at $69.14 per share if any of the triggering
events of the termination fee occurred. “Viacom was permitted to pay for the shares with
a senior subordinated note of questionable marketability instead of cash,” or could require
Paramount to pay in cash “the difference between the purchase price and the market price
of Paramount’s stock” (the “put feature”). Id. Given that both QVC and Viacom were offering about $90 per share for Paramount’s stock, being able to acquire Paramount stock at
$69.14 (with subordinated debt and put options) was a very attractive option for Viacom.
See Part III.E. for an auction theory–based analysis of stock lockups.
45 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185 (upholding the lower court injunction of the deal protection measures); Paramount, 637 A.2d at 51 (invalidating the no-shop and stock option
provisions of Paramount’s contract with Viacom). According to Professors Subramanian
and John Coates, the incidence of asset lockups and stock lockups dropped significantly
after Revlon, Paramount, and Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del.
1989). See Coates & Subramanian, supra note 34, at 326–30.
46 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
47 Id. at 925–26, 936. The case is unique in the sense that there was a group of controlling
shareholders (defendants Jon Outcalt and Kevin Shaw, who were both directors and officers of NCS Healthcare, Inc., and owned 65% of the voting power) who also entered into a
voting agreement with Genesis (the initial buyer), under which Outcalt and Shaw granted
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Perhaps in response to the judicial hostility, stock and asset lockups would gradually disappear over time (at least) in public company mergers. Termination fees, however, would remain in the
landscape.48 In Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,49 the Delaware Supreme Court permitted a termination fee as a proper means of
compensating a disappointed buyer.50 Even though the termination fee (to be paid by the target Bell Atlantic) was $550 million,
the court ruled that it did not violate the directors’ fiduciary obligations nor contract law’s antipenalty principle, partly because
the fee constituted only about 2% of Bell Atlantic’s market capitalization. In subsequent cases, while being lenient toward the
presence of a termination fee, courts have been a bit more vigilant
toward its size. For instance, in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus
Amax Minerals Co.,51 the Delaware Court of Chancery criticized
a 6.3% termination fee as “seem[ing] to stretch the definition of
range of reasonableness . . . beyond its breaking point.”52 More recently, in In re Comverge, Inc.,53 the Delaware Court of Chancery
characterized a 5.6% termination fee as “test[ing] the limits of
what this Court has found to be within a reasonable range for
termination fees.”54

Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., an irrevocable proxy. Id. at 926. Without a fiduciary termination right (which would have allowed NCS Healthcare to cancel the shareholders’
meeting when consistent with their fiduciary obligations), even if the directors of NCS
Healthcare were to change its recommendation to the shareholders, which, in fact, they
did, due to the voting agreement, Genesis would still have been able to close the deal. Id.
at 936.
48 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
49 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997).
50 Id. at 50. According to Coates and Subramanian, the incidence of termination fees
jumped from 33% to 65% after the case. See Coates & Subramanian, supra note 34, at 331.
51 Nos. CIV.A. 17398, CIV.A. 17383, CIV.A. 17427, 1999 WL 1054255 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 27, 1999).
52 Id. at *2.
53 No. 7368-VCP, 2014 WL 6686570 (Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2014).
54 Id. at *14. As Subramanian and Professor Fernán Restrepo summarize:
In this case, the merger agreement provided for a two-tier termination fee under
which Comverge (the target company) would pay HIG (the bidder) $1.206 million if Comverge entered into a superior transaction during the go-shop period
and $1.93 million if it did so after the expiration of the go-shop period. In addition, Comverge would reimburse HIG for expenses up to $1.5 million in either
scenario. The total payable to HIG would then be 5.6% of the deal equity value
before the expiration of the go-shop period and 7% afterward. The court noted
that even the lower bound of this range was high and further added that this
was true even for microcap acquisitions (where, as reflected in the opinions
discussed above, there is somewhat more flexibility with respect to the size of
termination fees).
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Dealmakers also began experimenting with other types of
deal protection devices, one of which was a match right. As seen
in the GPC-Essendant transaction, a match right, when requested by the buyer (the right holder), obligates the target corporation to negotiate in good faith in allowing the buyer to match
the third party’s offer so as to render the third party’s offer no
longer superior. An important doctrinal development took place
in In re Toys “R” Us. When Toys “R” Us, Inc. (the target), agreed
to sell most of its toy business to Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.
(KKR), they agreed to various deal protection mechanisms, including a 3.75% termination fee and an unlimited three-day
match right.55 Under the latter, Toys “R” Us had an obligation to
negotiate in good faith with KKR for three business days to allow
KKR to revise its offer, and there was no limit on how many
times KKR could exercise the right.56 When the shareholders of
Toys “R” Us challenged the deal protection measures, the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld their validity, stating: “[N]either
a termination fee nor a matching right is per se invalid. Each is a
common contractual feature that, when assented to by a board
fulfilling its fundamental duties of loyalty and care for the proper
purpose of securing a high value bid for the stockholders, has legal legitimacy.”57 Resting upon the holdings of Brazen and Toys
“R” Us, by now the two most frequently used deal protection

Restrepo & Subramanian, supra note 31, at 1025–26 (citations omitted). While the size of
the termination fee raises some interesting issues, there does not seem to be a clear-cut
guideline from the cases. At the same time, practitioners seem to have converged on the
range of 3 to 5% (of the deal price) as being reasonable. See id. at 1026. One factor that
drives the size presumably is the respective bargaining power between the buyer and the
seller. See Adam B. Badawi & Elisabeth de Fontenay, Is There a First-Drafter Advantage
in M&A?, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1154–55 (2019) (showing how one party having the
first-drafter advantage affects various deal provisions).
55 In re Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 997. The final merger agreement
contained four deal protection measures: 1) a fixed termination fee of $247.5 million, equal to 3.75% of equity value or 3.25% of enterprise value—payable for the
most part only if the Company terminated the merger agreement in order to sign
up another acquisition proposal within a year [a tail period]; 2) an agreement to
pay up to $30 million in documented expenses after a naked no vote [i.e., if the
Toys “R” Us shareholders vote down the proposal even in the absence of a competing proposal]; 3) a relatively non-restrictive no-shop clause that permitted
the consideration of unsolicited bids; and 4) a temporally-limited [three-day]
match right.
Id. In the deal, the match right was given as part of the fiduciary out exception to the noshop covenant. Id. at 996–97.
56 Id. at 997. For a more detailed discussion of match rights, see infra Part II.B.
57 In re Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 1017.
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devices in acquisition transactions with publicly traded target
corporations seem to be a right to match a third party’s bid and a
termination fee.58
A couple of subsequent cases seemed to put the courts in a
more lenient posture regarding deal protection in answering
whether the target directors might have breached their fiduciary
duties. In Lyondell Chemical, the buyer, Basell AF, controlled by
Leonard Blavatnik, made an offer to cash out all the shares of
Lyondell Chemical Co. at $48 per share, thereby putting the deal
in the Revlon mode.59 The merger agreement also included various deal protection measures, including a $385 million termination fee (which constituted about 3% of the equity value of the
transaction), a no-shop clause with a fiduciary out, and a match
right for Basell.60 When the plaintiff-shareholders challenged the
transaction, arguing, among others, that the deal protection
measures were preclusive and coercive, and the defendants
moved for summary judgment, the Delaware Court of Chancery
denied the motion, stating that whether the directors breached
their fiduciary duties under Revlon raised various questions of
fact.61 The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, however.62 While
not specifically focusing on the deal protection measures, the
Court stated that “there are no legally prescribed steps that directors must follow to satisfy their Revlon duties. Thus, the directors’ failure to take any specific steps during the sale process could
not have demonstrated a conscious disregard of their duties.”63
Similarly, in C & J Energy Services, which also involved a
match right and a $65 million termination fee, the Delaware Supreme Court overturned the Chancery Court’s injunctive order for
the target (C & J Energy Services) to actively shop itself. While
not focusing specifically on the deal protection measures, the
Court stated:

58 See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also Fernán Restrepo & Guhan
Subramanian, The Effect of Prohibiting Deal Protection in Mergers and Acquisitions: Evidence from the United Kingdom, 60 J.L. & ECON. 75, 88 (2017) (empirically examining the
effect of the U.K.’s banning of deal protection devices on mergers and acquisitions activities); Coates & Subramanian, supra note 34, at 331 (outlining an earlier empirical study
of buy-side lockups).
59 See Lyondell I, 2008 WL 2923427, at *6.
60 Id. at *8 & n.35.
61 Id. at *18.
62 See Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan (Lyondell II), 970 A.2d 235, 244 (Del. 2009).
63 Id. at 243.
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Revlon and its progeny do not set out a specific route that a
board must follow when fulfilling its fiduciary duties. . . .
When a board exercises its judgment in good faith, tests the
transaction through a viable passive market check, and gives
its stockholders a fully informed, uncoerced opportunity to
vote to accept the deal, we cannot conclude that the board
likely violated its Revlon duties.64
Finally, with respect to the question whether deal protection
devices can deter third parties from competing against the buyer (i.e.,
undermine a post-signing market check), the Court stated that a
post-signing market check is effective “so long as interested bidders
have a fair opportunity to present a higher-value alternative, and
the board has the flexibility to eschew the original transaction
and accept the higher-value deal.”65
In sum, the line of fiduciary duty cases, from Revlon and
Paramount v. QVC to Lyondell Chemical and C & J Energy Services, seems to indicate that when the transaction is viewed from
the issue of whether the target directors have breached their fiduciary duties (under Revlon or Unocal), over time the courts
seem to have taken a more permissive approach toward deal
protection measures. At the same time, the Omnicare case (along
with Revlon and Paramount) tells us that it is possible for certain
(combinations of) deal protection measures to be “preclusive and
coercive”66 or to constitute a breach of directors’ fiduciary duty.67
Unfortunately, however, where that line is has yet to be answered
in a satisfactory manner.68

64

C & J Energy Servs., 107 A.3d at 1053.
Id. at 1067–68.
66 Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936.
67 Paramount, 637 A.2d at 51–52.
68 According to Kling, Nugent, and Van Dyke, a crucial aspect to this question is
whether the deal protection devices can “unduly” deter third parties from making competing bids:
65

[T]he economics of the executed agreement must be such that it does not unduly
impede the ability of third parties to make competing bids. Types of arrangements that might raise questions in this regard include asset lock-ups, stock
lock-ups, no-shops, force-the-vote provisions, and termination fees. The operative word is “unduly;” the impact will vary depending upon the actual type of
device involved and its specific terms.
KLING, NUGENT & VAN DYKE, supra note 36, at 4-91 (emphasis in original).
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B. The Recent Appraisal Controversy
While the fiduciary duty case law has taken a more permissive direction on deal protection measures, a recent controversy
surrounding target shareholders’ right to an appraisal has
breathed a new perspective into the issue.69 Unlike the previous
line of cases that focused on the target directors’ fiduciary duties
(including Revlon duties), appraisal cases raise a different set of
questions: What is the fair value of the target’s shares, and how
should courts determine that fair value? The recent controversy
on the appraisal remedy had to do with whether, and under what
circumstances, the court can use the deal price itself as an indicator of fair value. Long dissatisfied with the perceived arbitrariness in how the courts determined fair value (which, on occasion,
substantially exceeded both the deal price70 and the preannouncement stock price), certain practitioners and scholars have advocated that the court use the deal price itself as an indicator of fair
value in an “arm’s-length” transaction. The Delaware Supreme
Court, in DFC Global and Dell, largely agreed. In Dell, for instance, the Court noted that when there is a large public float of
the target company’s (Dell’s) stock with many analysts following,
when the deal is done on an arm’s-length basis, and when the deal
is shopped with numerous potential buyers, the Chancery Court
will be abusing its discretion by not using the deal price (or even
the pre-signing market price) as a “relevant factor” in determining fair value.71
In short, DFC Global and Dell seem to dictate that courts use
the deal price as an indicator (but perhaps not an exclusive indicator) of fair value when certain conditions are met, although neither case seems to clearly lay out what the sufficient or necessary
conditions are. And, this is where deal protection devices come
into play: in determining if there has been sufficient competition

69

In Delaware, target shareholders who dissent from (or do not vote in favor of) certain types of mergers are entitled to ask the Chancery Court to appraise the fair value of
their shares and receive that value in cash from the surviving corporation. See DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2020). For an overview and how using the deal price (merger price) can
decrease target shareholders’ expected return, see generally Choi & Talley, supra note 23.
70 See Choi & Talley, supra note 23, at 564 (finding under an auction-theoretic model
that fair-value assessments tend to exceed the deal price). For instance, in the case of Dell,
the Delaware Court of Chancery, applying the discounted cash flow analysis, determined
that the fair value of Dell’s shares was $17.62, substantially higher than the deal price of
$13.75, which, in turn, was about 37% higher than the company’s 90-day-average unaffected stock price. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 5.
71 Dell, 177 A.3d at 20–21.
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for the target corporation (especially after the agreement has
been signed).72 Presumably, if the deal is too tightly locked up, so
as to deter any interested third-party buyer from competing
against the inside buyer, there is no market for the target corporation and the deal price (agreed to between the inside buyer
and the target without any external market pressure) would become much less reliable in determining what the fair value of the
target stock is.
The case of In re AOL directly addresses this issue. The Delaware Court of Chancery, in determining the fair value of AOL
Inc.’s stock, declined to use the deal price as an indicator of fair
value due to, among other things, the presence of deal protection
devices. The acquisition agreement between Verizon Communications Inc. (the buyer) and AOL (the target) included a no-shop
provision, a 3.5% termination fee of $150 million, and an unlimited three-day matching right for Verizon.73 Although AOL was
entitled to accept a “superior proposal” from any third party (a
standard fiduciary out exception to a no-shop clause), no competing buyer emerged.74 The court, citing the presence of deal protection devices and other problematic issues, such as a statement by
Tim Armstrong (AOL’s CEO) that he was “committed to doing the
deal with Verizon,”75 concluded that the sale process was not “Dell
Compliant,”76 and the deal price could not be used as relevant

72 In this sense, the issue addressed in appraisal cases is different from that raised
in fiduciary duty cases. In appraisal cases, the relevant question with respect to deal protection devices is whether their presence leads to our confidence in using the deal price as
an indicator of fair value. By contrast, in fiduciary duty cases, the relevant question is
whether their presence indicates the target directors’ breach of fiduciary duties (including
Revlon duties). Notwithstanding the difference, some have argued that the analysis should
be similar. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Finding the Right
Balance in Appraisal Litigation: Deal Prices, Deal Process, and Synergies, 73 BUS. LAW.
961, 962 (2018) (arguing that “the Delaware courts’ treatment of the use of the deal price
to determine fair value does and should mirror the treatment of shareholder class action
fiduciary duty litigation”). Others have argued that the questions should be treated differently. See, e.g., Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Flawed Corporate Finance of Dell
and DFC Global, 68 EMORY L.J. 221, 269 (2018) (arguing that Dell and DFC Global “conflate questions of fiduciary [duty] liability with the valuation questions central to appraisal disputes”).
73 In re AOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *7.
74 Id.
75 Id. at *9.
76 According to the court, a transaction is “Dell Compliant” when “(i) information was
sufficiently disseminated to potential bidders, so that (ii) an informed sale could take
place, (iii) without undue impediments imposed by the deal structure itself.” Id. at *8.
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evidence of fair value.77 The court, instead, applied the discounted
cash flow analysis (as many courts have done in the past) to determine AOL’s fair value.78
Three more recent cases, Aruba, Columbia Pipeline, and
Stillwater Mining, all decided in 2019, put an additional interpretive wrinkle on deal protection devices in appraisal actions.79 In
all three cases, while there are some factual variations, the target
corporation pursued a strategy of negotiating with one buyer
(known as the “single-buyer strategy”) and adopted deal protection measures that included both a termination fee and an unlimited match right.80 In none of these cases did a competing buyer
emerge after the agreement was signed. Notwithstanding the
presence of deal protection devices, in all three cases, the court
determined that, after closely examining the respective negotiation history, the price was the reliable measure of fair value. In
the process of coming to that conclusion, the Columbia Pipeline
and Stillwater Mining courts focused on several indicia of reliability: (1) the fact that the merger was an arm’s-length transaction; (2) the target directors did not face any (material) conflicts
of interest; (3) the buyer conducted due diligence and received
confidential information about the target’s value; (4) the target
negotiated with the buyer and extracted multiple price increases;
and (5) most importantly, no bidders emerged during the
postsigning phase.81 Particularly with respect to the fifth factor,
according to the Stillwater Mining court, the nonemergence of a
77 According to the court, “Armstrong’s post-Agreement statements to the press
about giving his ‘word’ to Verizon could reasonably cause potential bidders to pause when
combined with the deal protections here.” Id. at *9 (emphasis added). In Dell, the termination fee was about 1% of Dell’s market capitalization, the buyer was given a one-time
matching right, and there was a 45-day go-shop period. Dell, 177 A.3d at 12. By contrast,
in In re AOL, the termination fee was about 3.5% of AOL’s market capitalization and Verizon was given an unlimited matching right. According to the court, “[c]umulatively, these
factors make for a considerable risk of informational and structural disadvantages dissuading any prospective bidder.” In re AOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *9.
78 In re AOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *10.
79 See In re Panera Bread Co., No. 2017-0593-MTZ, 2020 WL 506684, at *29 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 31, 2020) (applying similar analysis to match rights and termination fees in an
appraisal proceeding).
80 For instance, in Aruba, the target (Aruba Networks, Inc.) had agreed to an unlimited match right, which gave the buyer (Hewlett-Packard Co.) five days to match the first
superior offer and two days to match any subsequent increase. There also was a termination fee of $90 million, representing 3% of Aruba’s equity value. See Verition Partners
Master Fund, Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448–VCL, 2018 WL 922139, at *38 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 15, 2018).
81 In re Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *22–23; Columbia Pipeline, 2019
WL 3778370, at *25–26.
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competing buyer was deemed to be “highly significant” in its conclusion that the deal price was a reliable indicator.82
Two salient patterns seem to emerge from the recent appraisal cases. First, the courts seem to rely more on the deal price
to determine fair value when certain conditions are satisfied. This
is to the exclusion of other measures, such as the discounted cash
flow measure or the unaffected (pre–merger announcement) market price. Second, and more importantly for our purposes, courts
do not seem less inclined to use the deal price as an indicator of
fair value when certain measures, such as a termination fee and
a match right, are present. With respect to match rights, however,
the debate remains. For instance, according to the Delaware
Court of Chancery in the Dell appraisal litigation, an unlimited
match right is a “powerful disincentive” against a third-party bidder’s making a topping bid.83 According to Professor Guhan
Subramanian, “[t]he match right [ ] fuels the winner’s curse problem: in any scenario where a third party bids and wins, it would
know that a better-informed party (namely, the initial bidder)
thought that the price was too high. Looking forward and reasoning back, a third party would be unlikely to bid.”84 Furthermore,
82 In re Stillwater Mining, 2019 WL 3943851, at *23. In emphasizing this factor, the
court relied on the reasoning from Aruba and Dell. In Aruba, the Delaware Supreme Court
had stated: “It cannot be that an open chance for buyers to bid signals a market failure
simply because buyers do not believe the asset on sale is sufficiently valuable for them to
engage in a bidding contest against each other.” Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136. Similarly, in Dell,
the court had found that the absence of a (postsigning) higher bid meant “that the deal
market was already robust and that a topping bid involved a serious risk of overpayment,”
which “suggests the [deal] price is already at a level that is fair.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 33.
83 See In re Appraisal of Dell, No. 9322–VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, at *41 (Del. Ch. May
31, 2016); see also Merion Cap. L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., No. 9320-VCL, 2016
WL 7324170, at *25 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) (“[T]he existence of an incumbent trade bidder
holding an unlimited match right was a sufficient deterrent to prevent other parties from
perceiving a realistic path to success. . . . Without a realistic path to success, it made no
sense to get involved.”); Blueblade Cap. Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Cos., No. 11184VCS, 2018 WL 3602940, at *22 (Del. Ch. Jul. 27, 2018) (citing Subramanian for the proposition that “unlimited match rights are typically perceived as limiting any ‘pathway to
success.’ . . . ‘[E]verybody agrees that match rights deter bids. It is not even a debated
question’” (alteration omitted)); In re Panera Bread Co., 2020 WL 506684, at *21 (citing
an investment banker’s testimony that “even customary matching rights may discourage
in a way and make it more challenging for other bidders to come forward” (quotation
marks omitted)).
84 See Subramanian & Zhao, supra note 31, at 1234. See supra note 31 for more discussion on winner’s curse problem associated with unlimited match right. For an analysis
of how an unlimited match right can be modeled as an English auction and concluding
that the winner’s curse problem does not arise in an English auction setting even if the
outside buyer has an informational disadvantage compared to the inside buyer, see infra
Part III.B, D.
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courts are willing to rely more on the deal price when no competing buyer emerges after the agreement is signed. At least in theory,
this is puzzling since the absence of a competing buyer can be the
result of one of two things: either that the deal price is already
sufficiently high so that no other third party is willing to offer
more, or that even though the deal price itself is not sufficiently
high, the deal protection devices successfully discourage other
buyers from emerging.85
II. MATCH RIGHTS AND TERMINATION FEES IN ACTION
This Part discusses, in more detail, how deal protection devices—match rights and termination fees in particular—are used
in practice. While there are many different types of deal protection measures, we can roughly divide them into two categories.
The first type (like a termination fee or a stock or asset lockup)
tries to compensate the disappointed buyer, while the second type
(like a match right or a no-shop provision) tries to more directly
control the target’s behavior. The first type of device allows the
disappointed purchaser to receive some financial compensation
from the target in case the deal does not close and the target is
sold to a different buyer. Stock or asset lockups, for instance, allow
a disappointed buyer to acquire the target corporation’s stock or
asset at a previously agreed-upon, favorable price.86 A target termination fee would stipulate a dollar amount that the disappointed buyer can collect from the target in case the target is sold to
a different buyer.87

85

Professor Subramanian has argued, for instance, that the presence of an unlimited
match right can undermine the reliability of the deal price as an indicator of fair value.
According to him, “an exclusive pre-signing negotiation followed by a go-shop process in
which the buyer gets an unlimited match right would probably not qualify for deference
to the deal price.” See Subramanian, supra note 31, at 226.
86 While the primary focus of this Article is on match rights and termination fees, I
briefly examine the impact of stock and asset lockups in Part III.E. In theory, poison pills
can also function as a deal protection device that compensate a disappointed buyer since,
when triggered, they allow the inside buyer to purchase the target’s stock at an attractive
price.
87 Sometimes, the purchaser corporation is obligated to make a fee payment to the
target; this is known as the reverse breakup (or reverse or buyer termination) fee. Such a
provision is most often used when the deal cannot close due to the purchaser’s inability to
satisfy the financing needs or inability to secure regulatory (such as antitrust or securities)
approval. See, e.g., Choi & Wickelgren, supra note 15, at 1–2. Unlike a target termination
fee, a reverse termination fee does not involve the presence of a third party buyer or seller.
In that sense, a reverse termination fee functions more like an incentive device (to secure
antitrust approval or line up necessary financing, for instance).
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The second type of device attempts to influence or control the
target’s preclosing behavior. The mechanism used most often is
known as the no-shop (or nonsolicitation) clause, which prohibits
the target from directly (or indirectly) soliciting a competing bid
from a third party.88 Others include covenant provisions that require the target corporation to hold a shareholders meeting—regardless of whether the target board decides to change its recommendation to the shareholders (a “force the vote” covenant),89 not
to change its recommendation to the shareholders (a “no change
in recommendation” covenant), or to exert necessary efforts, such
as “best efforts,” in securing various approvals, such as those from
the government entities or other contracting parties. At the same
time, given that the target’s directors owe fiduciary obligations to
the corporation and their shareholders, it is common for no-shop
or other protective clauses (such as the no change in recommendation covenant) to conditionally allow the directors to consider
an unsolicited bid and engage with a third-party bidder in case
the bid is more attractive. Another often-used device is a match
right. Often combined with other covenants, such as a no change
in recommendation or no-shop covenant, a match right allows the
buyer to match a competing bid, so as to make the competing bid
no longer more attractive to the target shareholders.
Given the emergence of termination fees and match rights as
two of the most visible and frequently used deal protection mechanisms,90 this Part focuses on them, with the help of some recent
mergers and acquisitions transactions: Nexstar Media’s acquisition

88 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A
PUBLIC COMPANY § 4.4, at 148–50 (2011) [hereinafter ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT].
At the other end of the spectrum, there is a “go-shop” clause, which allows or even obligates
the target corporation to shop the deal around for a prespecified duration. Go-shop periods
can kick in either before or after the agreement has been signed. See, e.g., Dell, 177 A.3d
at 12. Although there is an interesting debate as to how effective a go-shop provision is
and whether it allows the target directors to satisfactorily discharge their fiduciary duties
(in getting the maximum price possible), this Article is focused on deal protection devices.
For a recent analysis of go-shop provisions, see Subramanian & Zhao, supra note 31,
at 1226–31.
89 Under Delaware law, a target company can agree to such a provision even if its
board were to change its recommendation to the shareholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 146 (2020).
90 See supra note 36.
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of Tribune Media91 and Google’s acquisition of Fitbit.92 This Part
also looks at the American Bar Association’s Model Merger Agreement.93 The transactions contemplate a reverse triangular merger
structure, in which the purchaser (the “Parent”) lets one of its
wholly owned subsidiaries (the “Merger Sub”) merge with a publicly traded target corporation (the “Company”), with the target
corporation as the surviving entity. I will first closely examine the
match rights used in the agreements and then turn to termination fees.
A. Target Termination Fee
In contrast to a match right, a termination fee does not attempt
to directly influence the target’s or the buyer’s behavior. Rather,
it allows a disappointed buyer to receive financial compensation
when certain conditions are satisfied. The most common conditions are the target’s consummation of an alternative or competing transaction or the target board’s changing its recommendation to its shareholders due to the emergence of a competing
bidder with a superior offer. As can be inferred from its name, a
termination fee provision is intimately tied with the right to terminate the agreement.94
For instance, in the Nexstar-Tribune transaction, Nexstar is
entitled to collect a $135 million termination fee from Tribune if
certain conditions are satisfied, the most important one of which
is if Tribune enters into an alternative transaction with a third
party.95 For instance, § 9.1 of the agreement, titled “Termination,”
lays out the circumstances under which the agreement can be

91 See generally Nexstar Media Group, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger Among
Tribune Media Company, Nexstar Media Group, Inc. and Titan Merger Sub, Inc. (Form 8-K,
Exhibit 2.1) (Dec. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement].
92 See generally Fitbit, Inc., Agreement and Plan of Merger by and Among Fitbit,
Inc., Google LLC and Magnoliophyta Inc. (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) (Nov. 1, 2019) [hereinafter Google-Fitbit Merger Agreement].
93 See generally ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 88.
94 Taking one step back, before one party has the right to terminate the contract,
there is usually a nonsatisfaction of a condition. A change in the target board’s recommendation, for instance, will first function as a nonsatisfaction of this condition, which will, in
turn, give the purchaser the right to terminate the agreement and to collect a termination
fee. See, e.g., ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 88, § 7.3(b), at 276–77.
95 Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement, supra note 91, § 9.3(a), at 78–79. By comparison, in the Google-Fitbit transaction, if Fitbit were to enter into a competing transaction
or Fitbit’s board were to change its recommendation to its stockholders, Google is entitled
to receive a termination fee of $80 million, which is roughly about 3.8% of the deal value
of $2.1 billion. See Google-Fitbit Merger Agreement, supra note 92, § 8.03(a)(i), at 86.
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terminated. It allows Nexstar to terminate the agreement when
a “Triggering Company Event” has occurred,96 which is defined to
include either Tribune’s board making a change in its recommendation to its shareholders (a “Company Adverse Recommendation
Change”) or Tribune entering into a transaction with a third
party (an “Alternative Company Acquisition Agreement”).97
With respect to the payment of the $135 million termination
fee, § 9.3(a)(i) states, in relevant part, that if the agreement is
terminated for either of those reasons, “the Company shall pay to
Parent . . . a fee in the amount of $135 million (the “Company Termination Fee”) at or prior to the termination of this Agreement.”98
In the previous Part, we saw that Tribune’s board is allowed to
change its recommendation to the shareholders in response to a
superior offer from a third party. Sections 9.1 and 9.3 impose an
obligation on Tribune to pay a $135 million termination fee if either Tribune’s board changes its recommendation in response to
a third party’s offer or sells itself to a third party. Given the fact
that as of the date of the merger announcement Tribune was valued at about $4.1 billion, a $135 million termination fee constituted about 3.3% of the deal value.99
An important condition with respect to the payment of a termination fee is that it expressly envisions the target entering into
a competing transaction. Furthermore, when the condition is satisfied and the agreement has been terminated, the buyer is not simply
entitled to recover its fees and expenses. In fact, the agreements
usually stipulate other occasions when the buyer is entitled to
only be reimbursed for its expenses. For instance, in the NexstarTribune agreement, § 9.3(b) states that:
If this Agreement is terminated by Parent or the Company
[in response to the Company shareholders’ failure to adopt
the agreement], then the Company shall pay to Parent . . . an
amount equal to the documented out of pocket costs and expenses, including any commitment fees under the Commitment Letter and the fees and expenses of counsel, accountants, investment bankers, Financing Sources, experts and
96

Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement, supra note 91, § 9.1(c)(i), at 77.
Id. § 1.1, at 3, 13.
98 Id. § 9.3(a)(i), at 78 (emphasis omitted).
99 See Tribune Media Co., Nexstar Media Group Enters into Definitive Agreement to
Acquire Tribune Media Company for $6.4 Billion in Accretive Transaction Creating the
Nation’s Largest Local Television Broadcaster and Local Media Company (Form 8-K, Exhibit 99-1) (Dec. 3, 2018) [hereinafter Exhibit 99-1].
97
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consultants, incurred by Parent in connection with this
Agreement and the transactions contemplated by this Agreement in an amount not to exceed $15,000,000 (the “Parent
Expenses”) as promptly as practicable (and, in any event,
within two (2) Business Days following such termination).100
As this section makes clear, if the proposal goes to a shareholder
vote and the Tribune shareholders do not approve the merger,
Nexstar is entitled to have only its expenses (broadly construed)
reimbursed and the total reimbursement is capped at $15 million,
substantially below the termination fee of $135 million in the
event Tribune enters into a competing transaction with a third
party.101 A large termination fee that is triggered when a target
enters into a competing transaction and allows the disappointed
buyer to recover substantially more than its expenses and fees
does much more than simply trying to make the disappointed
buyer whole and to protect its reliance interest.102
100 Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement, supra note 91, § 9.3(b), at 79. For the role of
the shareholders’ vote in the right of either the Parent or the Company to terminate, see
id. § 9.1(b)(iii), at 77.
101 An important variation on the expense reimbursement in case the target shareholders reject the deal is what is known as the “naked no vote” or “no vote” fee. Under such
a provision, the buyer will be entitled to collect a stipulated amount from the target. Unlike the Tribune-Nexstar deal, the Google-Fitbit transaction employs a naked no vote provision. Section 8.03(a)(ii) of the agreement states that, in case Fitbit shareholders do not
approve the transaction and the agreement is terminated either by Fitbit or Google, “the
Company shall pay . . . to Parent . . . an amount equal to $21,000,000 (such amount, the
‘No Vote Fee’).” Google-Fitbit Merger Agreement, supra note 92, § 8.03(a)(ii), at 86–87
(emphasis omitted). The presence of a large naked no vote fee, unlike an expense reimbursement provision, raises the specter of whether the target shareholders would be “coerced” to vote in favor of the merger, particularly when there is no competing buyer that
is offering a more attractive consideration, and how large a naked no vote fee can be. This
issue remains unresolved. In the case of In re Lear Corp. Shareholder Litigation, 967 A.2d
640 (Del. Ch. 2008), the Delaware Court of Chancery had an opportunity to consider this
provision. But relying in part on the factual findings that the target directors agreed to a
naked no vote fee in return for a higher consideration (from $36 per share to $37.25 per
share), and that the naked no vote fee of $25 million was only 0.9% of the total deal value,
the Court determined that the target directors did not breach their fiduciary duties and
the naked no vote fee did not constitute a corporate waste. See id. at 641, 648, 656–57.
102 In certain cases, the disappointed buyer is entitled to get both its expenses reimbursed and also collect a termination fee. The provisions from the ABA Model Merger
Agreement are exemplary. For instance, § 7.1(e) allows the purchaser corporation to terminate the agreement when the target board has changed its recommendation to its shareholders. ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 88, § 7.1(e), at 259. When the
agreement has been terminated in accordance with § 7.1(e), § 7.3(a)(ii) allows the purchaser corporation to recover its expenses and § 7.3(b)(i) allows the purchaser to collect
the stipulated termination fee. Id. § 7.3(a)(ii), (b)(i), at 276. Sections 7.1(f) and 7.3(b)(ii)
provide that the termination fee can also be triggered when the deal fails to close for other
reasons, such as material inaccuracy in the target corporation’s representations and
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Termination fees raise some difficult contract law issues as
well, some of which have not been fully resolved. There is the
question of whether a termination fee should be treated as liquidated damages and, if yes, whether the antipenalty doctrine
should allow the court to strike down some of the fees.103 According to the Second Restatement of Contracts, “[d]amages for
breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement. . . .”104
But, an important condition here is that the liquidated damages
must be for breach of contract. If the contract expressly allows one
party to terminate the contract and also collect a termination fee,
it is not entirely clear whether a breach has occurred.105 A true
breach happens presumably when one party does not abide by the
terms of the agreement, for instance, when one party attempts to
terminate a contract even in violation of the express terms of the
contract. Since the primary goal of a merger agreement is to execute a merger, a termination fee could be thought of as setting up
an alternative performance obligation for the target.
The distinction here is important because if a termination fee
is classified as liquidated damages, under the antipenalty rule
(doctrine) of contract law, it cannot be unreasonably large when
compared to the actual or anticipated loss (by the purchaser).106
If, on the other hand, a termination fee is not liquidated damages,

warranties, the target’s failure to satisfy other covenants, or the target corporation’s
consummation of a competing transaction within a specified period of time after the termination (known as the “tail period”). See id. §§ 7.1(f), 7.3(b)(ii), at 259, 276. In sum, the
goal of the termination fee is to allow the disappointed purchaser to collect a financial
reward when the target consummates a transaction with a different buyer.
103 Another issue is whether a termination fee should be the exclusive remedy for the
buyer. Acquisition agreements generally stipulate that, in case termination is triggered
pursuant to the agreement, a termination fee is the exclusive remedy for the buyer. See,
e.g., GPC-Essendant Merger Agreement, supra note 2, § 9.03(e), at 81 (“[I]n the event that
the Termination Fee is paid in accordance with this Section 9.03, the payment of the Termination Fee shall be the sole and exclusive remedy of GPC.”).
104 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (AM. L. INST. 1979); see also
U.C.C. §§ 2-718 to -719 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
105 This issue is heightened by the fact that not all terminations lead to collection of
a termination fee. For instance, if the deal falls apart due to the parties’ failure to receive
necessary regulatory approval, the purchaser is not likely to collect a termination fee from
the target corporation. Termination fees are much more closely associated with the presence of a competing transaction and this increases the possibility that the parties may be
using termination fee so as to deter a third-party bidder and also to extract more rent from
a third party.
106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (AM. L. INST. 1979) (“Damages for
breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at an amount that is
reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual loss caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss.”).
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presumably no such restriction would apply. Also, unless other
problems, such as conflicts of interest on the part of the directors
and managers, are present, a termination fee would only be subject to a deferential business judgment review under corporate
law.
Notwithstanding this difficulty, the Brazen v. Bell Atlantic
Corp. court treated a termination fee as liquidated damages and
that holding still seems to control.107 Perhaps in response to the
Brazen line of cases, oftentimes, the transacting parties will expressly stipulate in their agreement that the termination fee
should (or can) be treated as liquidated damages and, more importantly, the size of the termination fee is reasonable (i.e., it does
not constitute a penalty). Here is an example from the NexstarTribune transaction. Section 9.3(c) of the agreement states:
The Parties acknowledge that (i) the agreements contained
in this Section 9.3 are an integral part of the transactions
contemplated by this Agreement, (ii) the Company Termination Fee and Parent Expenses are not a penalty, but are liquidated damages, in a reasonable amount that will compensate
Parent in the circumstances in which such fee is payable for
the efforts and resources expended and opportunities foregone
while negotiating this Agreement and in reliance on this
Agreement and on the expectation of the consummation of the
transactions contemplated hereby, which amount would otherwise be impossible to calculate with precision and (iii) that,
without these agreements, the Parties would not enter into
this Agreement.108
What is interesting in the Nexstar-Tribune example is that, not
only do the parties expressly state that the termination fee and
107 Brazen, 695 A.2d at 43. The court based its decision partly on the fact that the
merger agreement itself (between NYNEX Corp. and Bell Atlantic Corp.) stated that the
termination fee “constitute[s] liquidated damages and not a penalty.” Id. at 46 (emphasis
omitted). According to the court,

the express language in section 9.2(e) of the agreement unambiguously states
that the termination fee provisions “constitute liquidated damages and not a
penalty.”
...
[W]e find no compelling justification for treating the termination fee in this
agreement as anything but a liquidated damages provision, in light of the express intent of the parties to have it so treated.
Id. at 47–48. But deferring to the parties’ classification seems to invite possible opportunism.
108 Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement, supra note 91, § 9.3(c), at 79 (first emphasis
in original).
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the expenses constitute liquidated damages, but also that they
are not a penalty.109 This raises an interesting question. Assuming that the Brazen line of cases is correct in treating termination
fees and expenses as liquidated damages, it is uncertain whether
the courts will also honor the parties’ express stipulation that the
fees and expenses are “reasonable” liquidated damages and therefore do not constitute a penalty.110 Furthermore, § 9.3(c) also
109

First and foremost, note that this language is quite similar to that used in the
Brazen case. Brazen, 695 A.2d at 46. The agreement seems to treat these two concepts,
liquidated damages and penalty, as being distinct, but this is likely incorrect. As mentioned
earlier, the antipenalty doctrine would apply when a termination fee is treated as liquidated damages. Hence, assuming that the courts will honor the parties’ designation of the
termination fee (along with expense reimbursement) as liquidated damages, now they will
be subject to the antipenalty doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1)
(AM. L. INST. 1979):
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only
at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss
caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a
penalty.
See also U.C.C. § 2-718 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017):
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only
at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm
caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or
nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
But see 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 12.18 (3d ed. 2004):
If [a stipulated damages provision] is condemned as a penalty, it is unenforceable. But the rest of the agreement stands, and the injured party is remitted to
the conventional damage remedy for breach of that agreement, just as if the provision had not been included. If the provision is sustained as one for liquidated
damages, both parties are bound by it.
110 From the strategic perspective, stipulating that a termination fee constitutes liquidated damages doesn’t seem to make a lot of sense, since, assuming that the court becomes more likely to honor that stipulation, the antipenalty doctrine would apply. It may
make more sense from the parties’ perspective to call a termination fee provision an alternative performance provision. By doing so, they become more likely to bypass the antipenalty
doctrine. The relevant provision in the Google-Fitbit agreement is somewhat cleaner in
this regard. Section 8.03(a)(iii), in relevant part, states:

[T]he Company Termination Fee shall constitute liquidated damages, and from
and after such termination, Company shall have no further liability of any kind
for any reason in connection with this Agreement or the termination contemplated hereby other than the payment of the Company Termination Fee . . . and
such payments shall be the sole and exclusive remedy . . . against the Company
. . . in the event of a termination of this Agreement giving rise to the payment of
the Company Termination Fee.
Google-Fitbit Merger Agreement, supra note 92, § 8.03(a)(iii), at 87 (emphasis added).
While stating that the termination fee will be the sole and exclusive remedy for Google if
the agreement is terminated pursuant to the agreement, if the deal falls apart due to other
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states that the termination fee is necessary to compensate Nexstar for the “efforts and resources expended and opportunities
foregone” while it is negotiating the deal.111 Presumably, though,
such reliance costs would be present even when the transaction
falls apart for other reasons, such as when Tribune’s shareholders
reject the deal without a competing buyer. As we saw earlier, however, in case that happens, Nexstar would be entitled to get only
its expenses reimbursed, up to the cap of $15 million, only oneninth of the termination fee of $135 million.112 What justifies such
drastically different fees? An important difference, of course, is
that the much higher termination fee kicks in when a third-party
buyer acquires the target.113 A termination fee, unlike a straightforward expense reimbursement provision, not only affects the
buyer and the target but also the third party, and this contractual
externality can have some interesting implications, as I examine
in more detail in the next Part.
B. Match Right
When an initial buyer is given a match right, once there is an
offer from a third party that is considered to be superior to the

reasons, Google will reserve the right to pursue other remedies, including expectation
damages or specific performance. See, e.g., id. § 9.09, at 92–93 (stating that in case the
provisions of the agreement “were not performed in accordance with their specific terms
or were otherwise breached,” the parties would be entitled to seek specific performance);
see also ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 88, § 7.2(b), at 273 (“[T]he termination of this Agreement shall not relieve any Party from any liability for fraud or any material inaccuracy in or breach of any representation or any material breach of any warranty,
covenant, or other provision contained in this Agreement.”). A termination fee, with or
without the “sole and exclusive remedy” clause, presents a classic example in which the
parties are anticipating possible ex post disputes when they are drafting their contract.
See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115
YALE L.J. 814, 873–76 (2006); Albert H. Choi & George Triantis, Designing and Enforcing
Preliminary Agreements, 98 TEX. L. REV. 439, 484–85 (2020).
111 Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement, supra note 91, § 9.3(c), at 79.
112 Id. In the Google-Fitbit transaction, by comparison, the termination fee was
$80 million while the “no vote fee,” which is triggered if Fitbit shareholders reject the deal,
was $21 million. So, the termination fee was about 4 times larger than the “no vote fee.”
See Google-Fitbit Merger Agreement, supra note 92, § 8.03(a), at 86–87; see also supra
notes 95, 101.
113 One important implication of that difference is that when the target is sold to a
different buyer, the initial buyer no longer has an option to try to execute the deal again
in the future. That is, unlike the deal simply falling apart (due, for instance, to the target
shareholders’ rejection), the third party’s jumping the deal leads to the initial buyer’s loss
of that option value. See supra note 15 (discussing the story of Dollar Thrifty Automotive
Group).
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buyer’s initial offer114 (subject to certain conditions), the right allows
the buyer (and obligates the target) to negotiate in good faith and
revise the buyer’s offer so that the third party’s offer is no longer
superior. Similar to other covenants, such as a no-shop provision,
a match right attempts to directly influence the target’s (or more
precisely, target directors’ and managers’) behavior.
The following provision, from the merger agreement between
Nexstar Media and Tribune Media, is illustrative.115 In § 7.3, titled “No Solicitation by the Company,” a match right can be triggered by the buyer, Nexstar Media (the “Parent”), before the directors of the target company, Tribune Media (the “Company”),
can change its recommendation to their shareholders in response
to, among other things, a more attractive offer coming from a
third party. Subsection (f), in relevant part, states:
Prior to making any Company Adverse Recommendation
Change or entering into any Alternative Company

114

According to the ABA Model Merger Agreement, “Superior Proposal” is defined as

an unsolicited, bona fide written offer made by a third party to acquire, directly
or indirectly, by merger or otherwise, all of the outstanding shares of Company
Common Stock or all or substantially all of the assets of the Company and its
Subsidiaries, which the Company Board determines in its reasonable judgment,
taking into account, among other things, all legal, financial, regulatory, and
other aspects of the proposal and the person making the proposal and an opinion
of an independent financial advisor of nationally recognized reputation (a) is
more favorable from a financial point of view to the Company’s stockholders than
the terms of the Merger, and (b) is reasonably capable of being consummated;
provided, however, that any such offer shall not be deemed to be a “Superior
Proposal” if any financing required to consummate the transaction contemplated
by such offer is not committed and is not reasonably capable of being obtained
by such third party.
ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 88, § 8.16, at 326 (last emphasis in original).
Hence, “superiority” emphasizes the financial aspect for the target shareholders while conditioning on the fact that the necessary financing is either obtained or likely obtained. See id.
115 On December 3, 2018, Nexstar Media Group and Tribune Media Company announced the merger, under which “Nexstar [would] acquire all outstanding shares of Tribune for $46.50 per share” (plus some extra in case there was a preclosing dividend). Exhibit
99-1, supra note 99. The deal valued Tribune at about $4.1 billion and the consideration
constituted about a 15.5% premium above Tribune’s closing price on November 30, 2018.
See Benjamin Mullin & Joe Flint, Nexstar Reaches Deal to Buy Tribune Media for $4.1 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2018), https://perma.cc/266W-AT23; Exhibit 99-1, supra note 99.
The merger was subject to the approval of the Federal Communication Commission (FCC)
and Tribune’s shareholders. Tribune shareholders approved the deal on March 12, 2019.
See generally Tribune Media Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 12, 2019). On September 13, 2019, the FCC approved the transaction. See Trib. Media Co., 34 FCC Rcd. 8436,
8463 (2019). The merger closed on September 19, 2019. See generally Tribune Media Co.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 19, 2019). No competing bidder emerged between the
signing and the closing of the merger.
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Acquisition Agreement, (i) the Company Board shall provide
Parent at least four (4) Business Days’ prior written notice of
its intention to take such action; . . . (ii) during the four (4)
Business Days following such written notice, the Company
Board and its Representatives shall negotiate in good faith
with Parent . . . regarding any revisions to the terms of the
transactions . . . in response to such Superior Company Proposal. . . . After compliance with the foregoing sentence, the
Company shall have no further obligations under the foregoing
sentence, and . . . shall not be required to comply with such obligations with respect to any other Superior Company Proposal.116
In accordance with the provision, after an unsolicited, superior
proposal (a “Superior Company Proposal”) has been made to the
target by a third party, before Tribune Media’s board can change
its recommendation regarding its deal with Nexstar Media to its
shareholders (a “Company Adverse Recommendation Change”),
among other things Tribune Media must, to the extent Nexstar
Media desires, negotiate in good faith with Nexstar Media for four
business days so as to make the third party’s offer no longer superior. Furthermore, the last emphasized sentence makes it clear
that Nexstar Media can require Tribune Media to negotiate in
good faith only once: this is a limited match right. What is also
interesting is that when Nexstar matches a third party’s offer, the
agreement does not obligate Tribune to accept Nexstar’s revised
offer. If the third party were to sweeten its offer in response to
Nexstar’s revised offer, Nexstar would no longer be entitled to an
exclusive match period.
By comparison, here are the relevant sections from the merger agreement between Google (the “Parent”) and Fitbit (the
“Company”).117 Under § 6.02, titled “Non-Solicitation; Acquisition
116 Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement, supra note 91, § 7.3(f), at 65 (emphasis
added). According to the merger agreement, “Superior Company Proposal” is defined as “a
Company Acquisition Proposal from any Person . . . which the Company Board determines
in good faith . . . to be more favorable, from a financial point of view, to the stockholders
of the Company than the transactions contemplated by this Agreement.” Id. § 1.1, at 12.
“Company Acquisition Proposal,” in turn, is defined as a proposal to acquire either 15% or
more of the company’s assets or business, or as when the company’s shareholders “hold
less than 85% of the equity interests or voting power” of the surviving corporation. Id.
§ 1.1, at 2–3.
117 On November 1, 2019, Fitbit, Inc., and Google LLC (a subsidiary of Alphabet, Inc.)
announced that Google would acquire all of the outstanding stock of Fitbit at $7.35 in cash
per share. Similar to the Tribune-Nexstar transaction, the Google-Fitbit deal was also
structured as a reverse triangular transaction, where Magnoliophyta, Inc., a wholly owned
subsidiary of Google, created for the sole purpose of the merger, was to merge into Fitbit,

790

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:757

Proposals,” Fitbit’s board, in response to a more attractive thirdparty offer (“Superior Proposal”), cannot change its recommendation (on the merger with Google) to its shareholders and also terminate the agreement:
(i) . . . [T]he Company shall not be entitled to terminate this
Agreement . . . unless:
(A) the Company shall have provided to Parent four (4)
Business Days’ prior written notice . . . advising Parent
that the Company intends to take such action; . . . and
(B) [ ] during such four (4) Business Day period . . . the
Company shall have engaged in good faith negotiations
with Parent . . . regarding changes to the terms of this
Agreement intended to cause such Acquisition Proposal
to no longer constitute a Superior Proposal. . . .
(ii) . . . any [ ] revisions to the financial terms or any other
material terms of a Superior Proposal . . . shall constitute a
new Acquisition Proposal and shall in each case require the
Company to deliver to Parent a new [notice] and a new two (2)
Business Day period shall commence thereafter.118
Similar to the Nexstar-Tribune agreement, after an unsolicited,
superior proposal has been made to Fitbit by a third party, before
the Fitbit board can change its recommendation (regarding the
existing deal) to its shareholders, the Fitbit board must (among
other things) negotiate “in good faith” with Google for four business days so as to make the third party’s offer no longer superior.
with Fitbit as the surviving corporation. See Fitbit, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov.
1, 2019). The merger consideration was about 19% above the latest Fitbit closing price.
See Rob Copeland & Patrick Thomas, Google to Buy Fitbit, Amping Up Wearables Race,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/ZX2M-24DZ. On January 3, 2020, Fitbit shareholders held a virtual special shareholders meeting (via exclusive live webcast) and approved the merger. See Fitbit, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 6, 2020). Between the
signing of the agreement and the shareholder approval, no competing buyer emerged.
118 Google-Fitbit Merger Agreement, supra note 92, § 6.02(e), at 66–67 (emphasis
added). According to the agreement, “Superior Proposal” is defined as
a bona fide written Acquisition Proposal . . . made by a Third Party that the
Company Board determines in good faith, after consultation with the Company’s
outside independent financial advisors and outside legal counsel, and considering all the terms of the Acquisition Proposal (including the legal, financial, financing and regulatory aspects of such proposal, the identity of the Third Party
making such proposal, the conditions for completion of such proposal, and the
timing and likelihood of consummation), to be more favorable to the holders of
Company Common Stock from a financial point of view than the Merger.
Id. § 1.01, at 12–13.
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Unlike the match right in the Nexstar-Tribune agreement, when
a third party revises its offer, a new, two-business-day requirement gets triggered, and there is no restriction on how many
times the match right will be triggered. This is an example of an
unlimited match right.119
A match right presents interesting contract and corporate
law questions of what additional obligations it actually imposes
on the target (or what additional right it gives to the buyer). This
issue can be examined in (at least) three different scenarios. First,
even without an express match right with an express good faith
obligation, the buyer can presumably always ask the target to
modify the agreement in response to a third party’s superior offer.
Second, with a limited match right, when the inside buyer tries
to sweeten its offer in response to a third party’s offer after its
match right has run out, the target is not prohibited from negotiating with the inside buyer. Third, when a third party makes a
superior offer for the target either initially or after the initial
buyer matches the third party’s offer, the target is not prohibited
from negotiating with the third party.
With respect to the first two issues, at least under contract
law’s default obligations, as far as the modification of an existing
agreement is concerned, both the target and the buyer have an
obligation to renegotiate in good faith.120 If the target were to

119 The match right in the ABA Model Merger Agreement is also unlimited but more
favorable for the acquirer. See ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 93, § 4.6(c),
at 170–71. Notably, not only is the match right unlimited, whenever a competing offer gets
revised, the buyer gets the same five-business-day period to negotiate with the target. Id.
On occasion, the parties will also stipulate that the target has an obligation to negotiate
with the buyer on an exclusive basis. See Subramanian & Zhao, supra note 31, at 1236.
120 According to the Second Restatement, “[e]very contract imposes upon each party
a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. L. INST. 1979). More specifically with
respect to modification, the Restatement states: “A promise modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either side is binding if the modification is fair and equitable
in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made. . . .”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a) (AM. L. INST. 1979). The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) is more explicit with the duty to modify in good faith. While the UCC
states that “[a]n agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration
to be binding,” the official comment states that “modifications made [under § 2-209(1)]
must meet the test of good faith imposed by this Act.” U.C.C. § 2-209(1) & cmt. 2 (AM. L.
INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). Although the contours of the good faith duty are not very
clear, under the UCC, it embodies at least two elements: (1) subjective honesty (i.e., the
parties must be honest with each other); and (2) commercial fair dealing (i.e., they must
deal fairly with each other). U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017);
see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 675 (2007) (explaining that modern courts hold parties to a
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simply refuse to renegotiate with the initial buyer who has no express match right or whose match right has run out, such a behavior may constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing under contract law.121 Under corporate law,
such a behavior can also constitute a breach of the target directors’ fiduciary duties.122 With respect to third-party buyers, given
that the target may not be in any contractual relationship with
them, the target presumably does not have a contract-law-based
obligation to negotiate with them (in good faith).123 On the other
hand, again, under corporate law, refusing to negotiate with a

commitment to negotiate in good faith once they have made a preliminary agreement);
Cathy Hwang, Deal Momentum, 65 UCLA L. REV. 376, 394–97 (2018) (examining why deal
lawyers say courts rarely enforce breaches of preliminary agreements); Choi & Triantis,
supra note 110, at 446–47 (analyzing the good faith duty in the context of modifying nonbinding preliminary agreements).
121 Whether contract law imposes an affirmative obligation to not refuse to renegotiate
is not entirely clear. For instance, according to comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-209,
modifications made thereunder must meet the test of good faith imposed by this
Act. The effective use of bad faith to escape performance on the original contract
terms is barred, and the extortions of a “modification” without legitimate commercial reason is ineffective as a violation of the duty of good faith.
U.C.C. § 2-209, cmt. 2 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (emphasis added). The UCC,
therefore, seems to contemplate that, to the extent that a modification has been made, it
must satisfy the good faith and fair dealing obligation. According to Professor Allan Farnsworth, on the other hand, the UCC’s good faith obligation
gives the victim the right to recover damages if the other party’s breach of the
duty of good faith resulted in a failure to arrive at a modification. Damages
should ordinarily be based on the victim’s reliance losses, as in the analogous
case of precontractual liability for breach of an agreement to negotiate in good
faith.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 109, § 4.22 (emphasis in original). But see Choi & Triantis, supra
note 110, at 455 & n.54 (showing that courts, even in New York and Delaware, have been
willing to grant expectation damages for breach of duty to negotiate in good faith). Assuming that the courts would be hesitant in granting expectation damages or other remedies,
such as specific performance, by expressly obligating the target to negotiate in good faith
(and also stipulating the remedy), the agreement seems to make it substantially easier for
the disappointed buyer to recover expectation damages or other remedies and not just
reliance damages.
122 Target directors’ corporate law obligations will depend on whether the transaction
is in “Revlon mode.” If it is, the directors will likely have to engage with any buyer (either
initial or outside) that makes a superior proposal. A limited match right, in that setting,
may not have as much a bite against the initial buyer.
123 If, for instance, the target has entered into a confidentiality agreement with the
third party, while negotiating with the third party so as to allow (assist) the third party
to make a superior offer may not constitute a “modification” of an existing contract, the
existence of a confidentiality agreement may impose some contract-based duties on the
target and the third party. For more in-depth analyses on the precontractual duty to negotiate in good faith, see supra note 120.
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third party who makes a superior offer can constitute a breach of
the target directors’ fiduciary duties.
What a match right seems to do, then, is to prevent the target
from accepting a third party’s offer without giving the initial
buyer a reasonable chance to compete. It also lays out a specific
time period (e.g., four business days in both the Nexstar-Tribune
and Google-Fitbit transactions) during which the buyer is granted
the right to (exclusively) negotiate with the target. Once the negotiation period is over, assuming that all the other conditions
have been satisfied, the target is free to either change its recommendation to its shareholders or even terminate the agreement,
presumably without having to worry about whether such behavior constitutes acting in bad faith under contract law or breaching
fiduciary duties under corporate law. With a limited match right,
as in the Nexstar-Tribune transaction, after the initial buyer has
exhausted its match right, under contract law the target is much
more free to accept a third party’s offer without having to engage
the initial buyer: Tribune “shall not be required to comply with
[good faith negotiation] obligations with respect to any other Superior Company Proposal.”124 If Tribune refused to negotiate further
with Nexstar after Nexstar’s match right ran out, it would be difficult to argue that Tribune’s behavior constituted a breach of the
implied duty to modify (or negotiate) in good faith under contract
law.125
A match right, in short, seeks to lay out some procedural safeguards that both the buyer and the target can rely on in making
sure that the target will come to the negotiating table and can
walk away once the obligation has been satisfied. While the default rules under contract law impose somewhat uncertain and
open-ended obligations (e.g., the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing) on the contracting parties with respect to contract
modification, a match right provides a more express guarantee
(and a clearer guideline) to the initial buyer and the target that
the initial buyer will be given the opportunity to meet the third
party’s offer and preserve the deal. Moreover, the target can
switch sides once the specified opportunity has been satisfied
with the initial buyer. Assuming that the target’s legal obligations toward the third parties remain relatively stable through
124

Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement, supra note 91, § 7.3(f), at 65.
While Nexstar may no longer have a strong contract claim against Tribune, it
would be interesting to know whether such a behavior would lead to breach of Tribune’s
directors’ fiduciary duties.
125

794

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:757

the competition and negotiation process, a limited or unlimited
match right at least tilts the bargaining leverage toward or
against the initial buyer.
III. THE EFFECT OF DEAL PROTECTION DEVICES
Having examined a brief history of deal protection devices in
practice, in this Part, I examine the impact of deal protection devices with the help of auction theory. As a preliminary observation, when an acquisition agreement is subject to a termination
fee or a match right, it is not surprising that it becomes more difficult for a third-party buyer to enter the fray and successfully
snatch the target away from the initial buyer. For instance, with
a match right, even after a third-party buyer makes a superior
offer to the target, within a contractually stipulated period of
time, the initial buyer can require the target to negotiate in good
faith, match the third party’s offer, and render the third party’s
offer no longer attractive. A match right can potentially create an
uneven auction format, where the initial buyer gets to observe the
third party’s offer before deciding whether to match the offer.
However, as we will see shortly, whether a match right in fact
creates an uneven playing field and whether either party will actually have an advantage depends significantly on whether the
match right is limited or unlimited.
The story with a target termination fee is, by comparison,
somewhat more straightforward. When a target has an obligation
to pay a termination fee, this can substantially decrease the target board’s incentive to accept a third party’s offer. As a simple
example, if the initial deal price is $110 million but the agreement
has a $10 million termination fee provision, for the target board
to seriously consider a third party’s offer, the offer has to be at
least $120 million (and not simply $110 million). If a third party’s
willingness to pay for the target falls between $110 and $120 million,
in the presence of a $10 million termination fee, the third party
will decline to enter the competition, even though it is possible
that the third party values the target more than the initial buyer
(e.g., when the initial buyer values the target at $115 million
while the third party buyer values the target at $118 million). In
addition, being able to collect a sizable termination fee reduces
the initial buyer’s incentive to compete against a third party. If,
for instance, the initial buyer values the target at $120 million
but can collect $5 million in termination fees, the maximum the
initial buyer would be willing to pay for the target is $115 million
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(and not $120 million). With decreased competitiveness from the
initial buyer, there is less vigorous competition when a competing
buyer emerges, which, in turn, leads to a lower return for the target.
What is somewhat counterintuitive is the fact that such deal
protection provisions can enhance both the initial buyer’s and the
target’s expected joint return.126 An important point to recognize here
is that the deal protection provisions not only affect the affairs
between two contracting entities—the initial buyer and the target—
but also affect the third party. Deal protection provisions are a
classic example of how a contract can generate an externality (a
contractual externality) for a third party.127 Furthermore, even
though a third party may be harmed by the deal protection devices,
the contracting parties can jointly benefit from them, which, in
turn, creates an opportunity for the target board to increase the
return for its shareholders. Finally, notwithstanding the possibility of increasing the return for the target shareholders, a deal protection mechanism can reduce efficiency by allocating the target
corporation’s assets to a buyer with lower valuation.128 While a
deal protection device harms the third party and reduces efficiency, it can increase the expected returns for the contracting
parties. This point can be most easily seen with a few simple, numerical examples of a match right and a termination fee.
A. Target Termination Fee
Suppose there is a target corporation (S) with a valuation of
$100 million (target’s stand-alone value). The target negotiates
with an initial buyer (B1), who values the target at $120 million,
for a possible sale. In this case, the target and the initial buyer
will execute an agreement at a price of P between $100 and
$120 million. For simplicity, suppose they agree on a deal price of
$110 million (P = $110 million). After entering into the agreement, suppose that there is a 50% chance that a new buyer will
126 This is true even when we assume that deal protection devices are not necessary
in inducing the initial buyer to investigate and make an offer for the target corporation.
127 See supra note 37.
128 An important assumption underlying this inefficiency result is that there is some
impediment to efficient (ex post) bargaining or renegotiation, such as asymmetric information. When a new buyer with a higher reservation value emerges and when all three
parties are fully informed of the respective valuations, rather than preventing the new
buyer from purchasing the target corporation, they can renegotiate the contract to take
down the deal protection devices and let the new buyer purchase the target corporation.
However, if the target and the initial buyer are unaware of the new buyer’s valuation, as
is assumed in our examples throughout, such a renegotiation will no longer be feasible.
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appear.129 With the other 50% probability, no new buyer appears.
While the new buyer’s valuation is at least $110 million, for ease
of analysis, let’s assume that there is a 20% chance that B2, which
values the target at $115 million, appears, and with the other
30% chance, B3, which is willing to pay up to $130 million for the
target, appears. Throughout, we will assume that the target’s
stand-alone value and the terms of the initial agreement are
known to all players (based, for instance, on the target’s publicly
observed market capitalization and the public filing of the agreement), but that a buyer’s reservation value is known only to that
player.130 For simplicity, though, we assume that B1 knows that
the outside buyer’s valuation is either $115 or $130 million with
respective probabilities: that is, the inside buyer knows the distribution of the outside buyer’s valuation.131
1. The case with no termination fee.
Suppose there is no termination fee. With the initial deal
price of $110 million, for the new buyer (either B2 or B3) to successfully break up the deal, the new buyer will have to offer at
129 Throughout the examples, we are assuming that the probability that a third-party
buyer appears to compete against the initial buyer is fixed. This assumption is made to
simplify the analysis. One obvious contractual choice that can potentially affect the probability that a competing bidder emerges is whether the agreement has either a no-shop or
a go-shop clause. With a go-shop clause (under which the target actively solicits thirdparty offers), one can imagine that the chance that a competing bidder emerges on the
scene is higher. Especially when such a clause will tilt the probability of a high-valuation
buyer (B3) emerging, the contracting parties have an even stronger incentive to adopt a
large termination fee so as to increase their joint profit.
130 Two points need to be made regarding the assumptions. First, given that the outside buyers get to observe the deal price of $110 million, the outside buyers may be able
to reverse engineer and find out that the inside buyer’s reservation value is $120 million,
or at least get more information about it. The substantive analysis on termination fees
will remain the same, however. If the outside buyers observe that the inside buyer’s valuation is $120 million, with no termination fee, B2 will simply decline to compete against
B1, whereas B3 will submit a competing bid of (slightly more than) $120 million and acquire the target, rather than going through an ascending-bid auction process. Second, and
more generally, we are assuming that, while the buyers (and the target) do not observe
other buyers’ valuations, they know their own while their valuations may be correlated.
This assumption sets up a private value auction. For a more detailed discussion, see infra
Part III.D.
131 More specifically, we assume that this outside buyer’s valuation and the probabilities are common knowledge. That is, all the players in the model know that the outside
buyer’s valuation will be either $115 or $130 million and their attendant probabilities.
This assumption will substantially simplify the analysis without taking away the main
thesis. Otherwise, we will have to start with a more general (possibly continuous) distribution. The assumption also gives the inside buyer an informational advantage against
the outside buyer.
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least $110 million to the seller. Furthermore, given that the initial buyer (B1) is willing to pay up to $120 million for the target,
we can imagine that, upon the entry of a new buyer, a bidding
competition between the buyers (either between B1 and B2 or between B1 and B3) will ensue. While there are many different ways
one can model the competition, the simplest and the most tractable way to think about this is to imagine that the buyers engage
in an ascending-bid English auction in which the initial bid starts
at $110 million. That is, the initial (commonly observed) price
starts at $110 million and keeps rising until only one bidder remains in the competition and the last remaining bidder becomes
the winner who pays the last observed price to the target.
When B2 (with a reservation value of $115 million) enters the
fray, for instance, the bidding competition between B1 and B2 will
result in B1 acquiring the target corporation at a price of (slightly
more than) $115 million. To see this, when the commonly observed bid starts at $110 million, each buyer is willing to stay in
the auction until the bid reaches its reservation value. Given that
the initial buyer (B1) is willing to pay up to $120 million for the
target while the competing buyer (B2) is willing to pay only up to
$115 million, when the bid reaches $115 million, B2 drops out of
the auction, the (commonly observed) price stops, and B1 is declared the winner. Using the same logic, when B3 (with a reservation value of $130 million) appears, B3 will be able to win the
auction and acquire the target at (slightly more than) $120 million.
What is the implication of the competition? First, from the
perspective of the target (S), there are three possible scenarios:
(1) a 50% chance no new buyer appears, and S is sold to B1 at
$110 million; (2) a 20% chance B2 emerges and competes, and S
is to sold to B1 at $115 million; and (3) a 30% chance B3 enters
and competes and wins against B1, and B3 acquires S at
$120 million. When we combine these three possibilities, the target’s expected net profit is $14 million.132 For B1, its expected
profit is $6 million.133 For B2 and B3, conditional on their entering
the competition, their profits are $0 and $10 million (= $130 million
– $120 million), respectively. Finally, whenever a new buyer
appears on the scene, the target is sold to the buyer with the
higher valuation: allocative efficiency is achieved. The results are
summarized in the second column in Table 1.

132
133

0.5 * ($110 million – $100 million) + 0.2 * ($115 million – $100 million) = $14 million.
0.5 * ($120 million – $110 million) + 0.2 * ($115 million – $110 million) = $6 million.
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2. The case with a termination fee.
Now suppose the target (S) and the initial buyer (B1) set the
initial purchase price at $110 million but with a termination fee
of $4 million: (P,T) = ($110 million,$4 million). The termination
fee is about 3.6% of the deal price. With the purchase price of
$110 million and the termination fee of $4 million, the minimum
the outside buyer (B2 or B3) will have to bid is now $114 million
(= $110 million + $4 million). At the same time, B1 can underbid
B2 or B3 by (slightly less than) $4 million and B1’s bid will still
be more attractive to S. The competition becomes uneven (the
auction becomes “asymmetric”) and the termination fee forces the
outside buyer to make the initial bid higher than the deal price at
least by the size of the termination fee: it forces the outside buyer
to make a “jump bid.”
Notwithstanding the uneven competition, so long as the size
of the termination fee is relatively small, competition will ensure
that the target will be sold to the buyer that values the target
more. The uneven playing field, however, will redistribute the
profit from the target to the initial buyer. When B2 enters the
competition by bidding (slightly more than) $114 million, B1 will still
be able to acquire the target at (slightly more than) $111 million.
When B3 enters the competition, on the other hand, B3 will win
at a price of (slightly more than) $120 million. Compared to the
case with no termination fee, the expected profit for S goes down
to $12 million.134 At the same time, the expected profit for B1
increases to $8 million.135 The expected profits for B2 and B3 stay
the same as before. In short, allocative efficiency is preserved, but
the distribution of the pie shifts in favor of the initial buyer (B1)
against the target (S).
In fact, it is easy to show that as the target termination fee
rises and the initial deal price stays constant, the target’s expected return goes down while the inside buyer’s expected return
improves. So long as the size of the termination fee is equal to or
less than the expected return from closing the deal for the initial
buyer (in our case, $10 million), we can ensure allocative efficiency: the outside buyer will be able to acquire the target only
when it values the target more than the inside buyer. A larger

134 0.5 * ($110 million – $100 million) + 0.2 * ($111 million – $100 million) + 0.3 *
($120 million – $100 million – $4 million) = $12 million.
135 0.5 * ($120 million – $110 million) + 0.2 * ($120 million – $111 million) + 0.3 *
$4 million = $8 million.
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termination fee creates a purely distributional effect. It simply
shifts the return from the seller to the inside buyer. When the size
of the termination fee is larger than the inside buyer’s expected
return from closing the deal (under the initial terms), on the other
hand, allocative efficiency is no longer guaranteed. In addition,
the target and the inside buyer can actually increase their expected joint return.
To see this, suppose, for instance, the target and the inside
buyer agree to a deal price of $116 million and a termination fee
of $8 million, which is about 6.9% of the deal price. Now, for an
outside buyer to compete against the inside buyer, it will have to
bid at least $124 million. This means that an outside buyer, like
B2, who values the target at $115 million, would simply decline
to enter the competition. Even if B2’s valuation were $123 million,
B2 would still decline to compete, even though it values the target
more than the inside buyer. A sizable termination fee (along with
the deal price) is generating an allocative inefficiency. At the
same time, for B1, given that closing the deal under the initial
terms produces an expected profit of (only) $4 million, whenever
a third party makes a bid of (slightly higher than) $124 million,
it is in B1’s interest to not compete and simply collect the termination fee of $8 million. That is, if B3 were to emerge and bid
(slightly higher than) $124 million, B1 will decline to compete,
and B3 will acquire the target at $124 million. The expected profit
for the target, then, becomes $16 million.136 The expected profit
for B1 is $5.2 million.137 The expected profits for B2 and B3 are,
respectively, $0 and $6 million. The results are tabulated in the
fourth column of Table 1.
3. A comparison.
When we compare these scenarios, a few salient observations
bubble up. Foremost, when the initial price remains unchanged at
$110 million, with a $4 million termination fee, compared to the case
with no termination fee, the target’s expected return is strictly lower
while the inside buyer’s (B1’s) expected return is strictly higher.
These results are not surprising: with a $4 million termination
fee, B1 can afford to be much less aggressive in competing against
an outside buyer and can still win the competition. When B2

136 0.7 * ($116 million – $100 million) + 0.3 * ($124 million – $100 million – $8 million)
= $16 million.
137 0.7 * ($120 million – $116 million) + 0.3 * $8 million = $5.2 million.
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emerged, B1 was able to acquire the target at $111 million, instead
of at $115 million. This implies that agreeing to pay a termination
fee to the initial buyer is a costly enterprise from the target’s perspective. More generally, holding the deal price the same, as the
termination fee gets larger, the target’s return gets smaller while
the initial buyer’s expected return gets larger.138 At the same
time, so long as the termination fee is smaller than B1’s expected
return from closing the deal under the initial terms ($10 million
in the numerical example), the joint profit of the target and B1
stay the same and there is no allocative inefficiency.
TABLE 1: THE EFFECT OF A TERMINATION FEE
No
Termination
Fee
(P,T) = ($110,$0)

With
Termination
Fee and Same
Price
(P,T) = ($110,$4)

With
Termination Fee
but
Higher Price
(P,T) = ($116,$8)

Target (S)
Expected Profit
(Res. Value = $100)

$14 million

$12 million

$16 million

Initial Buyer (B1)
Expected Profit
(Res. Value = $120)

$6 million

$8 million

$5.2 million

Target and Initial
Buyer Joint Profit

$20 million

$20 million

$21.2 million

$0

$0

$0

New Buyer (B3) Profit
(Res. Value = $130)

$10 million

$10 million

$6 million

Possible Inefficient
Sale of Target?

No

No

Yes

New Buyer (B2) Profit
(Res. Value = $115)

When the termination fee is larger than B1’s expected return
under the initial terms, by comparison, not only will the joint
profit of the target and B1 increase, but there is also the danger
of allocative inefficiency. This was seen in the example in which
the deal price was $116 million and the termination fee was
$8 million. Compared to the case with no or a moderate ($4 million)
termination fee, the joint profit of the target and the inside buyer
is strictly higher: $21.2 million versus $20 million. The additional
138 Conditional on deal price, therefore, as the target’s bargaining leverage increases,
the target would prefer to set a lower termination fee. See Badawi & de Fontenay, supra
note 54, at 1149–51.
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joint return comes from the fact that the duo extracts a higher bid
from the high valuation outside buyer (B3). Since B3 enters the
scene with 30% probability and B3 wins the competition with a
$4 million higher payment, this translates to an expected increase
of $1.2 million (= 0.3 * $4 million). A large termination fee also
creates a possible allocative inefficiency. If an outside buyer’s valuation is higher than $120 million but below $124 million, for
instance, even though the outside buyer values the target more
than B1, it will simply decline to compete against B1. In short, a
large termination fee will allow the target and the inside buyer to
realize a higher expected return while potentially prohibiting an
outside buyer who values the target more than the inside buyer
from acquiring the target.
B. Match Right
As we saw earlier, when an inside buyer is given the right to
match an outside buyer’s offer, the target, after receiving a superior proposal from an outside buyer, must allow the inside buyer
to match the outside buyer’s offer (i.e., negotiate in good faith with
the inside buyer) so as to make the outside buyer’s offer no longer
superior. Given that a match right allows the existing buyer to
match a new bidder’s offer and consummate the transaction, at
least in theory, it is similar to another commonly observed contractual mechanism, the right of first refusal.139 Simply stated,
when the target corporation grants a right of first refusal to the
initial buyer, whenever an outside buyer emerges and makes an
offer to acquire the target, the right holder (the initial buyer) can
simply match the outside buyer’s offer and acquire the target.
With a properly structured right of first refusal, both the target
corporation (grantor of the right) and the initial buyer (the right
holder) can increase their expected joint returns at the expense of
the new buyer.140
139 For a more detailed, auction-theory-based analysis, see generally Albert H. Choi,
A Rent Extraction Theory of Right of First Refusal, 57 J. INDUS. ECON. 252 (2009); see also
Restrepo & Subramanian, supra note 31, at 1061 n.213 (comparing a match right to a
right of first refusal); Quinn, supra note 31, at 1027 & n.95 (same).
140 When a right of first refusal is in place, the right holder can basically engage in
“cream-skimming”: declining to exercise the right (i.e., not matching a third party’s offer)
only when a third party’s offer is higher than the right holder’s valuation for the property.
When a third party acquires the property, then, the joint (gross) return for the right-holder
and the property owner is higher than the right holder’s valuation. By contrast, without a
right, the joint profit will be equal to the right holder’s valuation. See Choi, supra note
139, at 254.
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1. A comparison to a right of first refusal.
A right of first refusal functions as a dynamic reserve price in
auctions, where the reserve price (the minimum price that starts
the auction process) is determined ex post by the outside buyer’s
bid.141 The reason a right of first refusal can increase the joint
profit of the target and the initial buyer is fairly straightforward.
With a right of first refusal in place, the initial buyer will decline
to match the outside buyer’s offer only when the outside buyer
offers more than the initial buyer’s reservation value ($120 million
in our example). Hence, when the initial buyer exercises the right
of first refusal and wins the competition, the joint gross return
(for the target and the initial buyer) will be $120 million. On the
other hand, when the initial buyer does not exercise the right of
first refusal, the joint gross return will be higher than $120 million.
By contrast, had an evenhanded auction process (such as an English auction) been held, whether or not the inside buyer wins the
contest, the joint gross return for the target and the inside buyer
would be $120 million: (1) in case the inside buyer wins, they realize a gross return of $120 million; (2) but if the outside buyer
wins, the outside buyer pays the inside buyer’s valuation of
$120 million.142 In short, a right of first refusal, much like a termination fee, can function as a surplus extraction mechanism
against outside buyers.
While it may be tempting to equate a match right used in a
mergers and acquisitions setting to a right of first refusal—especially since, under both mechanisms, the inside buyer is given the
right to match an outside buyer’s offer—there are some important
differences. Under a conventional right of first refusal, once the
inside buyer matches an outside buyer’s bid, the competition ends
and the inside buyer acquires the target. With a match right, however, the inside buyer’s matching of an outside buyer’s bid does
not end the competition. The outside buyer, after observing the
inside buyer’s matching bid, is free to come back with another,
more attractive offer for the target.143 In fact, while the inside

141 The reserve price is the minimum price that the bidders must submit to be able to
participate in the auction process. With the right of first refusal, the right holder’s reservation value functions as a reserve price.
142 If an English (or second price) auction is not being used, the gross return for the
target and the inside buyer may be lower than the inside buyer’s valuation when an outside buyer wins the auction.
143 This is subject to the caveat that the target does not have an obligation to negotiate
in good faith with a third-party buyer, with whom the target does not have a contractual
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buyer may be contractually limited in how many times it may be
able to exercise the right, there is no formal constraint on how
many times the outside buyer may be able to come back with a
revised offer for the target. Furthermore, even if the inside buyer
were to match an outside buyer’s offer, unlike the conventional
right of first refusal, the match right does not obligate the target
to accept the inside buyer’s matching offer. The target can take
the matching offer and negotiate with the outside buyer to entice
the outside buyer to sweeten its offer. In short, a match right used
in a mergers and acquisitions setting, in some sense, turns the
conventional right of first refusal on its head.144 A limited match
right, in particular, constrains the inside buyer’s behavior for the
benefit of the outside buyer.
2. Limited match right.
To be able to more concretely examine the impact of a match
right, let’s examine a simple numerical example. Just as in the
previous example, let’s assume that the target’s reservation value
is $100 million, the initial buyer’s reservation value is $120 million,
and the parties agree on the initial deal price of $110 million.
Also, after the initial agreement has been entered into, there is a
chance that a new buyer will appear who will attempt to jump the
deal and purchase the target. Just as before, we will assume that
there is a 50% chance that a new buyer does not appear, with a
20% chance that a new buyer with a valuation of $115 million
(B2) will appear, and with a remaining 30% chance that the new
buyer’s (B3’s) valuation is $130 million. As before, we continue to
assume that the buyers do not observe the others’ valuations,145

relationship. See supra Part II.B. Of course, the target directors may have a fiduciary
obligation to engage with the third party when the third party’s revised offer is more
attractive than the initial buyer’s matched offer.
144 There are also a few other differences between a conventional right of first refusal
and a match in a mergers and acquisitions context. First, in a mergers and acquisitions
context, the initial buyer has already agreed to purchase the target corporation at an
agreed-upon price. By contrast, in a conventional right of first refusal setting, no such
price has been determined between the property owner and the right holder. Second, in a
conventional right of first refusal setting, though not always, there often is a preexisting
relationship between the property owner and the right holder. The most common case is
that between an owner-landlord and tenant. See Choi, supra note 139, at 252–54, 256.
145 We are assuming that the inside buyer knows that the outside buyer’s reservation
values will be either $115 or $130 million, while the outside buyer only knows the distribution of the inside buyer’s reservation value. If we assume that, based on the deal price
of $110 million, the outside buyers can infer the inside buyer’s valuation of $120 million
while the substantive analysis will remain the same, in the case with an unlimited match
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but B1 knows that the outside buyer’s valuation is either $115 or
$130 million, with respective probabilities.
Now, suppose that the initial agreement contains a match
right. To focus on the match right, let’s assume that there is no
termination fee. We will discuss later the implication of having
both. The match right can be of two types: limited (M < ∞) or unlimited (M = ∞). If the match right is unlimited, there is no limitation on how many times the initial buyer can match the new
buyer’s offer. If the match right is limited, on the other hand, the
number of times that the initial buyer can exercise the right will
be capped in the agreement. Although, in theory, this cap can be
any number, to make the analysis simple, we will focus on the
case where the initial buyer can exercise the match right only
once: the cap is set at 1 (M = 1).146 In sum, when the match right
is unlimited, the initial buyer (the right holder) can exercise the
right as many times as it desires; whereas if the match right is
limited, the initial buyer can exercise it only once. We will see
later that as the cap rises, a limited match right will become more
like an unlimited match right.
Suppose the initial buyer has a limited match right, subject
to which the initial buyer can match the new buyer’s offer only
once (M = 1). If, after matching the new buyer’s initial bid, the
outside buyer offers a more (financially) attractive offer as its second bid, the initial buyer will be out of luck and the target will be
sold to the new buyer.147 An important difference between the initial and the outside buyers is that, while the new buyer is free to
revise and increase its earlier bid, the initial buyer is constrained
to match the outside buyer’s bid only once. A limited match right
creates an uneven playing field in favor of the outside buyer and
against the initial buyer. When the outside buyer is aware of the
fact that the initial buyer can match its offer only once (while the
outside buyer is free to revise its offer), it is readily apparent that

right the inside buyer will benefit while the target will suffer. In that case, if the outside
buyer has a valuation of $115 million, rather than triggering an auction, it will simply
decline to participate. This will allow the inside buyer to acquire the target at $110 million
(rather than at $115 million).
146 As we saw in Part II.B, allowing the buyer to match a third party’s offer only once
seems to be the most common type of limited match right. I have not been able to find a
real-life example in which a limited match right allowed the buyer to match more than
once.
147 I am, of course, taking a simplified and stylized view of how match rights work for
the purposes of presenting a simple numerical example. For a more detailed legal analysis,
see supra Part II.B.
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the outside buyer has no incentive to start the competition by
making an offer that is substantially more attractive than the initial price.
For instance, suppose the outside buyer’s reservation value
is $130 million (which, as assumed, happens with 30% probability). The outside buyer (B1) will start the competition by making
an offer that is slightly higher than the initial price of $110 million. When the initial buyer is asked to match that offer, we can
see that, no matter what the matching bid is, the initial buyer
(B1) will lose the competition and the $130 million buyer (B3) will
be able to acquire the target. Given that the initial buyer (B1)
values the target at $120 million, the initial buyer’s matching offer will be below its reservation value of $120 million and B3 will
be able to acquire the target by revising its offer to be slightly
higher than the initial buyer’s revised offer. For instance, suppose, B3 makes an offer at $111 million and B1 makes a “matching” bid of $117 million. B3 will now be able to purchase the target
by offering $118 million. The bottom line is that when the outside
buyer’s reservation value is $130 million, (1) the target will always be sold to the outside buyer; and (2) the final sale price will
be (at least slightly) lower than the initial buyer’s reservation
value ($120 million).
What if the outside buyer’s reservation value is, instead,
$115 million? Just like the outside buyer with a $130 million valuation, the buyer (B2), knowing that it can increase its bid ex post
in response to the initial buyer’s match, will start the bidding at
slightly above the current price of $110 million. From the initial
buyer’s perspective, it does not know whether the topping bid is
coming from the buyer with a $130 or $115 million valuation.
But, it does know that if it were coming from the buyer (B3) with
$130 million valuation, it will lose the bidding for certain,
whereas if it were coming from the buyer (B2) with $115 million
valuation, it may be able to prevail in the competition. The best
strategy for the initial buyer, therefore, is to match the outside
buyer’s bid by bidding slightly higher than $115 million. By doing
so, the initial buyer (B1) retains the chance of winning the auction
at least 40% of the time, conditional on there being an outside
bidder. When the initial buyer bids at slightly above $115 million
(say, $116 million), the $130 million valuation buyer (B3) will top
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that bid (with, say, $117 million) while the $115 million buyer
(B2) will decline to increase its bid above $115 million.148
3. Unlimited match right.
Now, suppose the initial buyer is given an unlimited match
right (M = ∞). That is, whenever an outside buyer revises its initial offer, the initial buyer will be able to come back and match
the revised offer from the outside bidder. Unlike the case with a
limited match right, with an unlimited match right, the initial
buyer and the outside buyer will have even standing in an auction. As each revises its bid, the other is able to top the competitor’s bid. An unlimited match right replicates a proper English
auction. When a competing buyer (B2 or B3) emerges, given that
the existing price is equal to $110 million, knowing that both parties will be able to continue matching the other’s bid, the topping
bid will start at a little above $110 million149 and will continue
rising until one bidder decides to drop out. For instance, if the
outside buyer’s (B2’s) valuation for the target is $115 million, the
initial buyer (B1), with a higher valuation of $120 million, will be
able to continue “matching” the outside buyer’s (B2’s) offer until
the bid rises to the outside buyer’s valuation of $115 million. The
inside buyer wins the auction process at a price equal to (or
148

More precisely, we can construct a pooling equilibrium in the following way. Working backwards, first, suppose either B2 or B3 are to submit a follow-up bid after observing
B1’s matching bid. The optimal strategy for B2 and B3 is to submit a follow-up bid that is
slightly higher than B1’s matching bid so long as B1’s matching bid is below $115 million
and $130 million, respectively. Otherwise, the bidder drops out. Second, suppose it is B1’s
turn to submit a matching bid. If the outside bidder’s type has not been revealed in the
earlier stage, B1’s optimal strategy is to (1) bid slightly above $115 million if the outside
bid is anywhere between $110 and $115 million and (2) bid slightly above any outside bid
above $115 million so long as the outside bid is below $120 million. Third, turning to the
initial stage, the optimal strategy for B2 and B3 is to submit the initial bid between
$110 and $115 million. So, in a pooling equilibrium, both B2 and B3 submit the initial bid
that is between $110 and $115 million; B1 submits a matching bid slightly above $115 million;
B3 comes back with a bid slightly above B1’s matching bid; and B2 drops out after observing B1’s matching bid.
149 If the third-party buyer knew (1) how much the initial buyer valued the target and
(2) that the initial buyer’s valuation is larger than the third party’s valuation, the third
party would not trigger the bidding competition. See Subramanian & Zhao, supra note 31,
at 1234 (“When the first bidder has an unlimited match right, a third party will bid only
if it believes it can beat the first bidder in a bidding contest.”). In the absence of such
knowledge, given that the third party rationally believes that the initial buyer’s valuation
can be anywhere above the deal price (of $110 million), that the third party does not know
whether it can beat the initial buyer for certain, and that the third party can always come
back with a revised offer, the optimal strategy is to start the bidding process at slightly
above the deal price.
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slightly higher than) the outside buyer’s (B2’s) reservation value
of $115 million. Similarly, when the outside buyer’s (B3’s) valuation is $130 million, the inside buyer and the outside buyer will
be able to compete against each other in an even auction competition until the bid reaches the inside buyer’s valuation of
$120 million.
In either case, whether B2 or B3 appears on the scene, as in
a standard English auction, the target gets sold to the buyer with
the higher valuation at a price equal to the valuation of the losing
bidder: with the $115 million outside buyer (B2), the target gets
sold to the existing buyer at $115 million; and with the $130 million
outside buyer (B3), the target is sold to the outside buyer at
$120 million. Since the target is being sold to the buyer with the
higher valuation, unlike in the case with a limited match right,
there is no allocative inefficiency. Furthermore, and more importantly, the target’s and the initial buyer’s joint expected profits
and the target’s stand-alone expected profits will be higher, too.
For instance, with a limited match right (M = 1), when the outside
buyer’s valuation is equal to $130 million, because the initial
buyer (B1) was matching the bid at (slightly above) $115 million,
the target is sold to the outside buyer at a price strictly below the
initial buyer’s valuation of $120 million. By contrast, with an
unlimited match right, the target is sold to the outside buyer (B3)
at the inside buyer’s valuation of $120 million. This increases
both the joint profit of the initial buyer and the target and also
the stand-alone profit of the target.
4. Some generalizations and comparisons.
The numerical example has, so far, assumed that the initial
buyer knows exactly what the likely valuations of the outside buyers are: it would be either $130 or $115 million. In a more realistic
scenario when the distribution of the outside buyer’s valuation
isn’t as simplistic, while the findings above will still remain correct, it creates three variations. First, when the inside buyer has
a limited match right, the target may be sold to a lower valuation
buyer: an allocative inefficiency may result. Second, unlike the
case with a termination fee, where the inside buyer’s stand-alone
profit always increased as the termination fee got larger, the inside buyer’s (B1’s) stand-alone profit may be higher or lower with
an unlimited match right. Third, with a more generalized distribution, low valuation of the outside buyer’s (B2’s) stand-alone
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profit will be higher when the inside buyer has a limited, rather
than unlimited, match right.
First and foremost, suppose the outside buyer’s valuation can
range anywhere between $110 and $130 million, the inside buyer
has a limited match right (M = 1), and the outside buyer starts the
bidding process at slightly above $110 million. Suppose also that
the initial buyer (B1), without knowing how much the outside
buyer is willing to pay for the target, matches the bid at anywhere
between the new bid and its own valuation of $120 million, say,
at $116 million. Unlike the case with two-point distribution (of
either $115 or $130 million), now, any time the outside buyer’s
valuation falls between the initial buyer’s (B1’s) matching bid (of
$116 million) and the buyer’s valuation (of $120 million), the outside buyer will be able to win the auction even though the outside
buyer values the target less than the initial buyer. For instance,
if the outside buyer values the target at $118 million, after observing the initial buyer’s matching bid of $116 million, the outside buyer will be able to come back with a more attractive bid of,
say, $117 million, and win the auction even though its valuation
of the target is lower than the inside buyer’s. In short, in a more
realistic setting, a limited match right can create allocative inefficiency. The last row of Table 2 reflects this possibility.
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TABLE 2: EFFECT OF A MATCH RIGHT
Limited Match
Right150
(P = $110; M = 1)

Unlimited Match
Right
(P = $110; M = ∞)

Target (S)
Expected Profit
(Res. Value = $100)

$12.5 million

$14 million

Initial Buyer (B1)
Expected Profit
(Res. Value = $120)

$6 million
(Likely lower with
more general
distribution)

$6 million

Target and Initial
Buyer Joint Profit

$18.5 million

$20 million

New Buyer (B2) Profit
(Res. Value = $115)

$0
(Higher with
more general
distribution)

$0

New Buyer (B3) Profit
(Res. Value = $130)

$15 million

$10 million

Possible Inefficient
Sale of Target?

Yes

No

Second, while the result will depend on the assumption of the
outside buyer’s valuation distribution, the inside buyer’s standalone profit will likely decrease as we shift from limited to unlimited match rights. In the numerical example, because the outside
buyer’s valuation was limited to being either $115 or $130 million,
and with a limited match right, the inside buyer was matching
the outside buyer’s bid at (slightly above) $115 million, the expected profit of the inside buyer stayed the same at $6 million: a
50% chance it acquires the target at $110 million (for a profit of
$10 million) and a 20% chance it acquires the target at (slightly
above) $115 million (for a profit of $5 million). But this is because

150 As discussed above, with a limited match right, when B2’s valuation is not fixed
at $115 million but is on a continuum between $110 and $120 million, for instance, B2’s
profit will be strictly larger than $0 while B1’s stand-alone expected profit may be higher
or lower than $6 million.
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the inside buyer knew exactly what B2’s valuation of the target
was and managed to shut out B2 from winning the auction. If, for
instance, the outside buyer’s valuation was on a continuum between $110 and $130 million, not only would the inside buyer’s
matching bid possibly be higher or lower than $115 million, but
the inside buyer’s probability of winning will also differ. While
this could either increase or decrease the inside buyer’s (B1’s)
stand-alone expected profit, given that, in case the outside buyer’s
valuation falls between $110 million and $120 million, the inside
buyer is no longer guaranteed to win the bidding competition, it
will likely reduce the inside buyer’s stand-alone profit.151
Finally, under the current setup, where B2’s valuation is
fixed at $115 million, B2 is always shut out from being able to
purchase the target (because of B1’s strategy of submitting the
matching bid of $115 million). But when B2’s valuation isn’t fixed
at $115 million and B1’s match right is limited, B2’s stand-alone
profit will increase. For instance, imagine B2’s valuation can be
anywhere between $110 and $120 million. Now, in response to
B2’s starting the bidding process at $110 million, B1 will submit
a matching bid that is between $110 million and $120 million and
B2, whose valuation is above B1’s matching bid, will now be able
to win the auction and realize a profit. When B1 had an unlimited
match right, B2’s winning the auction was not possible. B2’s ex
ante profit will be higher when the inside buyer has a limited
match right than an unlimited match right. The second column of
Table 2 summarizes these findings.
C. Termination Fees Versus Match Rights
When comparing these two deal protection devices, some interesting similarities and differences emerge. As we moved (in
Part III.A) from no termination fee to a positive (and substantial)
termination fee, the joint profit of the target and the inside buyer
increased while the outside buyer’s expected profit decreased.
Similarly, as we moved (in Part III.B) from a limited match right
to an unlimited match right, the joint profit of the target and the
inside buyer went up while the outside buyer’s expected profit
went down. Consistent with the practitioners’ observations,
151 For instance, if B2’s valuation is uniformly distributed between $110 and
$120 million (while B3’s valuation is anywhere above $120 million), it is fairly easy to show
that the optimal strategy for the inside buyer is to submit a match bid of $115 million. In
that case, while B1’s profit margin stays the same, B1’s probability of winning, conditional
on B2’s appearance, decreases by half, thereby lowering B1’s expected profit.
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unlimited match rights and termination fees are generally bad for
the competing buyer. To the extent that the outside buyer has to
spend (possibly substantial) resources in participating in the bid,
the lower expected profit can potentially translate to a lower rate
of participation. At the same time, however, as the numerical
examples show, an important goal of agreeing to either a termination fee or an unlimited match right is to extract more surplus
from a high-valuation outside buyer (such as B3). And to the extent
that an outside buyer’s valuation for the target is substantially
high, the reduction in auction participation may be less likely or
unlikely. After all, the numerical examples already show how
these deal protection devices can shut out low-valuation buyers
(such as B2), whose expected profit may not justify their participation costs.
There are also some important differences between the two
devices. First and foremost, as we moved (in Part III.A) from no
termination fee to a positive and substantial termination fee, allocative efficiency suffered: if the outside buyer had only moderately higher valuation than the inside buyer, the outside buyer
was shut out from competition. As the size of termination fee got
larger, the outside buyers were subject to a larger disadvantage
vis-à-vis the inside buyer. By contrast, when we moved (in
Part III.B) from a limited match right to an unlimited match
right, allocative efficiency actually improved: by creating a more
even playing field among the inside buyer and the outside buyer,
an unlimited match right created an English auction–like environment. Another important difference is on the target’s standalone expected profit. Holding the initial deal price constant,
when the target agreed to a termination fee, its stand-alone profit
suffered. By contrast, even with the same deal price, when we
switched (in Part III.B) from a limited match right to an unlimited match right, the target’s stand-alone expected profit actually
increased.
Finally, consider the possibility of the transacting parties utilizing both a termination fee and a match right. In such a case,
the interaction between the two deal protection devices can produce some interesting results. For instance, with a limited match
right, because a termination fee increases the reserve price in the
auction, a higher termination fee can mitigate (or even eliminate)
the potential inefficiency that stems from the limited match right.
This will especially be the case when the termination fee is equal
to the difference between the initial buyer’s reservation value and
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the deal price. When the initial buyer values the target at
$120 million, the deal price is $110 million, and the termination fee
is $10 million, for instance, a third-party buyer will enter the competition only when it values the target at more than $120 million,
and when it does so, the initial buyer will decline to match: the
target will be sold to a third-party buyer only when the thirdparty buyer values the target more. By contrast, when the match
right is unlimited, so long as the termination fee is less than the
difference in the initial buyer’s valuation and the deal price, allocative efficiency is not affected.152
D. Interdependent Valuation and the “Winner’s Curse”
Problem
So far, the numerical examples have assumed that while the
buyers and the target do not observe other buyers’ valuations,
they know their own (although their valuations may be correlated). This assumption sets up a private value auction.153 Alternatively, we could have assumed a more “interdependent” or
“common” valuation structure, in which each buyer does not know
its own valuation and only gets a “signal” about the valuation.154
While the assumption of an interdependent valuation raises the
possibility of what is known as the “winner’s curse” problem155—
in which the winner of the auction ends up paying more for the
target than it values—this possibility does not arise when the
parties engage in an ascending-bid English auction. The primary
reason is that when the bidders observe whether the other competing bidders are participating in the auction, they can infer the
signals that the other bidders have gotten and the informational
issues disappear or are (substantially) mitigated.156 In the case of

152 Whether or not the match right is limited, when the termination fee is higher than
the difference between the initial buyer’s valuation and the deal price, allocative inefficiency will result. See supra Part III.A.2.
153 See VIJAY KRISHNA, AUCTION THEORY 13–28 (2002).
154 Id. at 83–102. As an example of a common-value setting, suppose both an inside
buyer (B1) and an outside buyer (B2) get respective signals about valuation (X1 and X2),
B1 only observes X1 and B2 only observes X2, and the common value for the target is given
by V = 0.5 * X1 + 0.5 * X2. In this setting, for B1, for instance, even after drawing a very
high signal (a realization of X1), it does not know the true value of the target without
knowing the realization of X2. It’s possible that if the realization of X2 is sufficiently low,
its true valuation is substantially lower than what the realization of X1 indicates.
155 Id. at 84–85.
156 Id. at 85. When the bidders are competing in a sealed-bid, first-price auction, by
contrast, the fact that one has won the auction (without knowing others’ signals) implies
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no termination fee or an unlimited match right, the optimal strategy for the outside buyers (B2 or B3) is to start the bidding process by offering a price that is slightly more than the deal price
that the winner has likely drawn the highest possible signal and the true value of the asset
is likely lower (given that others have drawn lower signals).
Some commentators have argued that because the initial buyer has an informational
advantage against an outside buyer, the presence of an unlimited match right can substantially impede the outside buyer from competing against the inside buyer. See supra
note 84 and accompanying text. There are three issues to consider with respect to this
concern:
First, while this may be true in a sealed-bid first-price auction setting (e.g., where the
outside buyer has to make a onetime bid and the inside buyer is given the right to either
match or not match the bid), in an English auction setting, where the bidders can observe
the others’ behavior and they continue bidding against one another (and infer the others’
valuation signals), this will not be true. The fact that the informational advantage does
not per se create a winner’s curse problem in an English auction setting can be seen using
the following, simple example. Suppose both an inside buyer (B1) and an outside buyer
(B2) get a respective signal about valuation (X1 and X2): B1 only observes X1 and B2 only
observes X2. Suppose also that B1’s valuation is given by V1 = X1 while B2’s valuation is
given by V2 = δX1 = (1 – δ)X2, where δ ∈ (0,1). By assumption, therefore, B1 knows its
valuation for certain, while B2’s valuation depends on both its own signal X2 and B1’s
signal X1. B1 has an informational advantage against B2. (We can impose some distributional structure here, but for the sake of simplicity, we skip that discussion.) It is easy to
show that the dominant strategy for B1 is to stay in the auction until the price reaches
X1. The optimal strategy for B2 is, then, to stay in the auction until the price is equal to
X2 (or possibly some price that is higher than X2). With these equilibrium bidding strategies, there are two possibilities. Suppose B2’s strategy is to stay in the auction until the
price reaches X2. First, suppose X2 > X1. As the price rises, B1 drops out when the price
reaches X1; and B2 wins the auction at price equal to X1. B2 acquires the target at X1 and
realizes a strictly positive surplus of V2 – X1 > 0. The auction achieves allocative efficiency. Suppose, instead, X1 > X2. In this case, B2 drops out when the price hits X2 and
B1 wins the auction. Again, allocative efficiency is achieved. In sum, even with the informational disadvantage, B2 does not suffer the winner’s curse problem.
Second, in fact, given that the inside buyer has already signaled its willingness to
purchase the target through the acquisition price ($110 million in our example), the informational advantage may actually be reversed to the extent that the price of the agreement
can (at least partially) reveal the inside buyer’s valuation.
The third point respects information rights. According to Kling, Nugent, and Van
Dyke, in order to make sure that a deal protection device does not unduly impede third
parties from competing against the initial buyer, the target should be able to
disclose confidential information to any third party who has on its own (i.e., not
been solicited) “shown up” in the sense that it has submitted a proposal or, at a
minimum, an indication of interest which is, or which the target believes is, reasonably likely to lead to (and who is capable of consummating) a higher competing bid. In this regard, the target should also be able to negotiate with such third
parties. This removes any informational advantage that the (initial) anointed
purchaser may have.
KLING, NUGENT & VAN DYKE, supra note 36, § 4.04[6][b], at 4-94 to -95 (citations omitted).
The presence of such information right will also likely eliminate (or substantially reduce) the
initial buyer’s informational advantage. See Quinn, supra note 31, at 1042–43 (discussing
various information rights given to the initial bidder can exacerbate the problem of information asymmetry).
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and to continuously update and match B1’s bid. After all, the outside buyers know that B1 at least values the target at the deal
price, and being able to observe B1’s competing offer allows them
to update their information on how much B1 values the target.
With an even playing field and with an ascending-bid, Englishauction structure, the winner’s curse problem does not arise.
When the playing field is uneven, on the other hand, there is
a possibility that, concerned about the potential winner’s curse
problem, either the outside or the inside buyer may decline to participate. This can happen when the deal structure contains a
(large) positive termination fee or when the inside buyer has only
a limited match right. Recall that, in either situation, either the
outside buyer (when there is a termination fee) or the inside buyer
(with a limited match right) is forced to submit a jump bid. For
instance, when the deal price is $110 million but the deal is subject to a $10 million termination fee, for B2 or B3 to compete
against B1, they have to submit an initial competing bid that is
higher than $120 million. If, for instance, B2’s or B3’s valuation
also depends on the information that B1 has (the valuations are
interdependent) and the outside buyers are sufficiently concerned
about whether their true valuation falls below $120 million (but
above $110 million), they may decline to compete against B1. This
may be so, even though B2’s or B3’s true valuation of the target
is higher than B1’s valuation. Similarly, when B1 can match outside buyer’s bid only once, and B1 is unsure about its true valuation for the target (because its valuation depends also on the information that B2 or B3 has), concerned about the possible
winner’s curse problem, it will no longer be able to make an aggressive jump (matching) bid. This can, in turn, make it more
likely that the target is sold to an outside buyer even though B1
may have a higher valuation.
In sum, when moving to a more general, interdependent valuation structure, there is a potential winner’s curse problem, but
in a way that renders both termination fees and limited match
rights worse for achieving allocative efficiency. In both cases, the
possible inefficiency results from forcing either the outside or the
inside buyer to make a jump bid. With a positive termination fee,
the outside buyer has to submit a jump bid, whereas with a limited match right, the inside buyer has to submit a matching bid
that may be substantially higher than the outside buyer’s competing bid. By contrast, when there is no termination fee or the
inside buyer has an unlimited match right, the concerns over
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suffering a winner’s curse will be substantially mitigated or eliminated with interdependent valuations and this, in turn, can better promote allocative efficiency.
E. Other Deal Protection Devices
So far, my principal focus has been on match rights and termination fees. But the auction-theory-based analysis can be easily extended to other deal protection mechanisms, notably stock
and asset lockups.157 In the case of a stock lockup, the inside buyer
is entitled to purchase a fraction of the target’s outstanding stock
at a contractually stipulated price in case the target is sold to a
competing buyer, whereas with an asset lockup, the inside buyer is
entitled to acquire the target’s asset (or division) at a predetermined
price. Although both mechanisms are facially similar to a breakup
fee (in the sense that they compensate a disappointed buyer),
there are some important differences. Notably, while the size (or
the value) of a termination fee is independent of how much the
outside buyer pays for the target, the value of a stock lockup is
proportionate to the outside buyer’s purchase price. This provides
an incentive to the inside buyer to be more aggressive in its bidding against the outside buyer. With aggressive bidding, allocative inefficiencies can arise. With an asset lockup, unlike a
breakup fee, the value of the pledged asset can differ across the
buyers, and this will affect how much each buyer would be willing
to pay for the target. In this Section, I will demonstrate this with
a few extensions of the previous numerical examples.
1. Stock lockup.
Recall that the inside buyer (B1) valued the target at
$120 million and initially agreed to acquire the target at
$110 million. Now, suppose B1 is also given the right to purchase
10% of the target’s outstanding stock based on a valuation of
$100 million (P0) in case the target is sold to a different buyer.
With the strike price of $100 million, if the target gets sold to another buyer at $130 million, for instance, B1 will be able to realize
a profit of $3 million (= 0.1 * ($130 million – $100 million)) by

157 While there are other deal protection mechanisms, such as no-shop clauses, standstill and voting agreements, and information rights, they are not discussed for the sake of
brevity. See Quinn, supra note 31, at 1016 (discussing, in more detail, various information
rights that come with match rights); Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 34, at 711 (arguing
that the courts should broaden their analysis of other protective measures).
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exercising this stock lockup option and (immediately) reselling
the stock to the winning buyer. Given that B1 is willing to pay up
to $120 million for the target, in case B1 wins the auction at price
P, it will realize a profit of $120 million – P. On the other hand,
in case B1 loses the auction and the winning bid is P, it gets to
realize a profit of 0.1 * (P – $100 million).158 Even this simple example shows an important difference between a termination fee
and a stock lockup. With a termination fee, the proceeds that the
disappointed B1 receives are fixed (at T). With a stock lockup,
however, the compensation for B1 depends directly on the winning bid: the higher the winning bid, the higher the compensation
for the inside buyer. This provides a strong incentive to B1 to try
to increase the winning bid as much as it can.
How much B1 can push up the winning price depends, in
part, on how much the outside buyer is willing to pay for the target
when B1 has the stock lockup. Using the example, suppose the
outside buyer values the target at either $115 million (by B2) or
$130 million (by B3). Knowing that B1 is entitled to sell 10% of
the target stock at $100 million to the winning outside buyer, in
case B2 or B3 wins the auction at P, the outside buyer has to pay
P + 0.1 * (P – $100 million). That is, for 10% of the outstanding
stock, the winning outside bidder has to pay an additional difference of P – $100 million. This will naturally reduce the maximum
price the outside buyer would be willing to pay for the target. B2,
for instance, would now be willing to stay in the auction until
P ≈ $113.64 million; and B3 would be willing to stay in the auction until P ≈ $127.27 million.159 At the same time, for B1, given
that it will be able to realize a profit of 0.1 * (P – $100 million) in case
it loses the competition and it values the target at $120 million,
B1 will be willing to stay in the auction at least until the price
reaches P ≈ $118.18 million.160
158 More generally, if the inside buyer is entitled to purchase a fraction, α ∈ (0,1), of
the target’s outstanding stock at the exercise price of P0, the inside buyer’s profit if it loses
the competition and the winning bid is equal to P is α(P – P0). See supra Part I.A (discussing Paramount v. QVC and the use of a stock lockup).
159 These numbers are calculated as follows: When an outside buyer values the target
at Ri and the inside buyer is entitled to a fraction, α, of the target stock at P0, the outside
buyer would be willing to pay up to P such that Ri = P + α(P – P0). When we solve for P,
we get P = (Ri + αP0) / (1 + α).
160 With the reservation value of R1, the inside buyer would be willing to stay in the
auction until R1 – P = α(P – P0). When we solve for P, we get P = (R1 + αP0) / (1 + α). Note
that the stock lockup affects the de facto “reservation values” of the inside and the outside
buyers by the exact same proportions. Hence, when the bidders are aware of each other’s
reservation values, the presence of a stock lockup does not affect who will be able to
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But will the inside buyer drop out of the race when the price
reaches $118.18 million? The answer is no. Recall that the assumption was that each buyer only knows its own valuation but
not the valuations of others. The example made a further simplifying assumption that while B2 or B3 did not know B1’s valuation, B1 knew that the outside buyer’s valuation was either
$115 or $130 million. This implies that when the auction price
reaches $118.18 million, rather than dropping out of the competition, the optimal strategy for B1 is to stay in the auction until it
reaches (slightly less than) $127.27 million. With the stock
lockup, while dropping out at $118.18 million would have produced a profit of about $1.82 million (≈ 0.1 * ($118.18 million –
$100 million)), pushing the winning bid up to $127.27 million
allows B1 to realize a higher profit of about $2.73 million (≈ 0.1 *
($127.27 million – $100 million)). Obviously, the assumption that
B1 knew that the outside buyer’s valuations were either $115 or
$130 million is extreme. But the point is that when buyers do not
know other buyers’ valuations and when one buyer is given a
stock lockup, because the size of the lockup increases with the
winning bid, the lockup recipient will have an incentive to be
more aggressive in its bidding.161
The result that a stock lockup makes the recipient more aggressive in its bidding strategy leads to a couple of important implications. The first is that it can sometimes lead to allocative inefficiency by shutting out an outside buyer who values the target
only marginally or moderately more than the inside buyer. From
the example, if an outside buyer valued the target only slightly
more than the inside buyer, say, at $121 or $122 million, when
the inside buyer becomes more aggressive and pushes up the auction price, even though the outside buyer values the target more,
it will be shut out from the competition. Another implication is
that, with a stock lockup, both the target’s stand-alone profit and
the joint profit of the inside buyer and the target can actually increase. By pushing up the (expected) winning auction price, although
an outside buyer who values the target only moderately more
than the inside buyer will be shut out, the target and the inside
buyer can extract more rent from the outside buyer who values
the target considerably more. The effect is similar to promising a
purchase the target (i.e., there is no allocative inefficiency). In this symmetric information
setting, the target will, on the other hand, realize a lower profit. This replicates Professor
Ayres’s principal finding. Ayres, supra note 34, at 695.
161 For a more general analysis, see Che & Lewis, supra note 32, at 653–54.
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large termination fee as seen earlier, when the target and the inside buyer can increase their joint profit by extracting more rent
from a high-valuation outside buyer.162
2. Asset lockup.
When the target grants an asset lockup to a buyer, the recipient is entitled to purchase the target’s promised asset (or a division) at a predetermined price when a competing buyer acquires
the target.163 Although the mechanics are quite similar to a termination fee, unlike with cash, buyers can assign different valuations to the asset, and an asset lockup can create allocative inefficiency. Coming back to the numerical example, suppose B1 is given
the right to purchase a target’s asset that is worth $10 million to
B1 at $5 million (the exercise price). However, due to the synergies that the asset creates for the target’s remaining assets, once
the asset is taken out of the target, outside buyers’ valuations go
down by $15 million. With the $5 million cash payment from B1,
the net reduction in valuation for the outside buyers would be
$10 million. Given that the asset lockup allows B1 to realize a
profit of $5 million in case it loses the target, B1 would be willing
to bid only up to $115 million for the target. Similarly, B2 and B3
would be willing to pay only up to $105 million and $120 million,
respectively.
With the asset lockup in place and the initial deal price of
$110 million (between B1 and S), now B2 will no longer participate in the auction. When B3 enters the competition, after bidding B3 will be able to acquire the target (minus the asset) at
(slightly more than) $115 million, the maximum B1 is willing to
pay for the target. Compared to the case without any lockups, the
target clearly suffers (because of B2’s lack of participation and lower
proceeds from B3’s winning), while B1 clearly gains. Although it
seems as though allocative efficiency is preserved, because of the
asset lockup, $5 million in value is being destroyed. Without any
lockup, the target would have generated a gross value of $130 million
(in B3’s hands). With the asset lockup, the gross value of the target
plus the asset is $125 million (= $115 million + $10 million). An
asset lockup can also prevent a higher-value bidder from

162 The effect is quite similar to that of granting the inside buyer a right of first refusal. See generally Choi, supra note 139 (showing how a right of first refusal allows an
inside buyer and a seller to extract rent from a higher-valuing outside buyer).
163 See supra Part I.A (discussing Revlon and the use of an asset lockup).
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acquiring the target. If, for instance, B3’s gross valuation of the
target had been $124 million (instead of $130 million), because
B3 would have been willing to pay only up to $114 million for the
target (minus the asset) when B1 had the asset lockup, B3 would
be unable to win the competition even though B3 would have valued the target (as a whole) more than B1.164
There is one important difference that distinguishes an asset
lockup from other deal protection measures. While it is plausible
that other deal protection devices, including termination fees,
match rights, and stock lockups, can under certain conditions increase the target and inside buyer’s joint profit, this is quite unlikely with respect to an asset lockup. The primary mechanism
through which a deal protection device can enhance the joint
profit is through the extraction of additional surplus from an outside buyer with a high valuation. In the case of a termination fee,
this is achieved through a large fee. A stock lockup or a match
right creates additional profit by enhancing the competitive posture of the inside buyer. Because an asset lockup, by contrast, actually lowers an outside buyer’s reservation value (and the potential surplus that the target and inside buyer can attempt to
capture), it is quite unlikely that an asset lockup can increase the
joint profit of the target and inside buyer, let alone the target’s
stand-alone profit. An asset lockup is the most problematic of all
in potentially undermining both efficiency and the target’s return.
IV. CORPORATE AND CONTRACT LAW IMPLICATIONS FOR
DEAL PROTECTION DEVICES
The analysis in the previous Part showed that, when properly
structured, deal protection devices, such as a termination fee and
a match right, can enhance the joint expected return of a target
and an inside buyer. But the issue whether a deal protection device
can enhance the target shareholders’ return is more subtle. As
seen earlier, holding the initial deal price fixed, when the target
agrees to a larger termination fee, the target’s stand-alone profit
decreases while the inside buyer’s expected return increases. By
contrast, when the target agrees to an unlimited match right,
both the target’s and the inside buyer’s returns (are likely to)
164 When the size of the asset lockup is substantial, it can also deter a higher-value
bidder from entering the competition. For instance, if an outside buyer values the target
at $122 million ($2 million higher than B1) but losing the asset would cost the bidder (in
net) more than $12 million, given the initial deal price of $110 million, the bidder would
decline to compete against B1.
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increase. Similarly, with a stock lockup, both the target’s and the
inside buyer’s returns increase. In these cases, the joint profit of
the target and the inside buyer go up as deal protection devices
become stronger.
A. Target Directors’ Role in Deploying Deal Protection Devices
For the target to share the benefit of increased joint profit, in
the case of a termination fee, the directors (and the officers) of the
target corporation have to negotiate with the buyer to increase
the deal price. As seen earlier, by agreeing to a termination fee of
$8 million while receiving a corresponding increase in the deal
price from $110 million to $116 million, the target is able to realize a higher profit of $16 million. With respect to a match right,
while successfully convincing the inside buyer to agree to an unlimited match right can increase the target’s profit, to the extent
that the inside buyer may also benefit from an unlimited match
right, the issue is whether the target directors can receive further
concessions from the inside buyer. Nonetheless, the issue of extracting a bigger deal premium isn’t as important as in the case
with a large termination fee. A similar argument would also apply
to a stock lockup.
Ultimately, then, whether deal protection devices can benefit
or harm the target shareholders depends on the target directors’
and officers’ incentives. Properly incentivized directors and officers will utilize deal protection devices to increase the return for
the target shareholders, while unincentivized directors and officers can deploy the same devices to favor one buyer over another
and to the detriment of the target shareholders. Presumably, the
latter scenario is more likely, when the agents are to receive substantial private benefits from promoting one buyer over another.
There are a number of possible scenarios. For instance, the target
directors and the officers may be guaranteed post-merger employment by the initial buyer.165 There also could be other types of side
agreements between the target directors and the officers with the
initial buyer, such as a consulting or financing agreement. Still
another possibility is that the target directors and the officers, as
investors or employees of the initial buyer, could receive direct

165 Although the top executives are often entitled to receive severance payments, often
known as golden parachutes, upon change of control, thereby inducing the top executives
to possibly prefer selling the company, it is unlikely that such severance payments are
structured so as to favor one buyer over another.
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pecuniary benefits from consummating the merger with the initial buyer. Perhaps the agents are under the influence of a block
holder (including a controlling shareholder) who may be pursuing
a different agenda. Finally, even if they are not pursuing their
own private benefits, when they are indifferent about shareholder
welfare, they could accede too easily to the initial buyer’s demands. In all of these scenarios, by agreeing to deal protection
devices (especially a large termination fee) with the initial buyer
without demanding anything in return, the target directors and
officers can increase the chances of closing the deal with the initial buyer to the detriment of competition.166
B. Deal Protection Devices and Determination of “Fair Value”
in Appraisal
Another dimension in which the directors’ and officers’ incentives matter is with respect to the question whether the court can
use the deal price as (reliable) evidence of fair value in an appraisal proceeding. The deal price issue can be examined from
both ex ante and ex post perspectives. From the ex ante perspective, as seen in the earlier analysis, when the target directors are
maximizing the returns for the target shareholders, they will be
able to negotiate a higher deal price in return for agreeing to a
generous deal protection. When this is the case, to the extent that
a court would consider an arm’s-length, negotiated deal price to
be probative of fair value, that evidentiary weight would be high.
With agents maximizing the return for the shareholders, the
presence of a deal protection device should actually encourage,
not discourage, the court to use the deal price as an indicator of
fair value. This is true even when there is no topping bid.
Even from the ex post perspective, we saw that the presence
of a termination fee or an unlimited match right is more likely to
produce a higher ex post deal price. For instance, when the highvaluation buyer (B3) appears, an unlimited match right forces the
outside buyer to pay the inside buyer’s valuation to acquire the
target, thereby producing a higher ex post deal price. In short,
when there is a topping bid and subsequent competition among
166

With respect to a termination fee, another possibility is that, in the absence of a
competing bid, a large termination fee that gets triggered when the shareholders vote
against the deal can meaningfully discourage the target shareholders from voting against
the deal. Such a “naked no vote” termination fee (as seen in the Toys “R” Us case), is different from the usual termination fees that are triggered upon consummation of a competing deal. For a discussion, see supra Part I.A.
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the buyers, using the winning bid as evidence of fair value will
substantially enhance the target shareholders’ returns.167 When
the directors’ and managers’ incentives are not properly aligned,
on the other hand, there is no guarantee that the deal protection
device will increase the deal premium, and the deal price becomes
less reliable in determining fair value of the target shares.168 In
such a setting, it would be better for the court to require an actual
competition among buyers before using the final deal price in assessing fair value. Table 3 summarizes the arguments.
TABLE 3: TARGET DIRECTORS’ BEHAVIOR AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Incidence of Deal
Protection Devices
Initial Deal Price
(Deal Premium)
Return (Ex Ante) for
the Target
Shareholders
Deal Price
as Evidence of
Fair Value?

Target Directors’
Incentives Are
Aligned

Target Directors’
Incentives Are
Not Aligned

Likely

Likely

Higher

Lower

Higher

Lower

More Reliable

Less Reliable

C. Contract Law Considerations
Deal protection devices also raise interesting contract law
problems. Given that the devices can discourage (or even prohibit)
a new bidder from competing against the inside buyer and can
reduce the new bidder’s return, they impose a negative (contractual) externality on the new bidder. A deal protection device, especially a large termination fee, can function like a noncompete

167 For more in-depth analysis on the importance of an actual auction among competing buyers (where there are multiple bids, as opposed to simple expressions of interest) in
enhancing target shareholders’ returns (and also in promoting efficiency), see Choi & Talley, supra note 23, at 559–60.
168 This concern is stronger with respect to termination fees than with match rights.
As seen earlier, in order for the target shareholders to share in the additional surplus
extracted through a large termination fee, the target directors must negotiate a higher
initial deal price. For a match right, even if the target directors were to grant an unlimited
match right, even without any price increase, the target shareholders can benefit.
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agreement169 or an agreement to exclude entry (such as a concerted refusal to deal). Under contract law, when a contract imposes an “unreasonable” restraint on trade, the contract will be
unenforceable based on public policy.170 Furthermore, especially
with respect to termination fees, contract law prohibits the parties from agreeing to liquidated damages that are unreasonably
large as against public policy.171 An unreasonably large liquidated
damages clause that allows a disappointed buyer to collect more
than what the buyer was expecting to receive under the contract
goes against the compensation objective of contract law remedies.172
Given the difficulty of deciding whether a certain provision imposes an unreasonable restraint on trade or allows compensation
that is unreasonably large, whether a certain deal protection device
should be struck down under contract law should be determined
on a case-by-case basis.
Regarding termination fees, several factors can come into
play. For instance, while practitioners often argue that a termination fee is necessary to compensate a disappointed buyer for all
169

See supra note 39.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 186–187 (AM. L. INST. 2017). Section 186(1), for instance, states that “[a] promise is unenforceable on grounds of public
policy if it is unreasonably in restraint of trade.” Courts have utilized this provision to
strike down unreasonable noncompete agreements. According to the official commentary,
170

[e]very promise that relates to business dealings or to a professional or other
gainful occupation operates as a restraint in the sense that it restricts the promisor’s future activity. Such a promise is not, however, unenforceable unless the
restraint that it imposes is unreasonably detrimental to the smooth operation of
a freely competitive private economy. . . . Whether a restraint is reasonable is
determined in the light of the circumstances of the transaction, including not
only the particular facts but general social and economic conditions as well.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186(1), cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2017).
171 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356(1) (AM. L. INST. 2017):
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only
at an amount that is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual loss
caused by the breach and the difficulties of proof of loss. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a
penalty.
This is known as the “antipenalty” doctrine. See Aaron S. Edlin & Alan Schwartz, Optimal
Penalties in Contracts, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 33, 48 (2003); Robert E. Scott & George G.
Triantis, Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 1428, 1456, 1481–82 (2004); see also Brazen, 695 A.2d at 49 (determining
that the termination fee, as liquidated damages, was not in violation of the antipenalty
rule); supra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.
172 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2017) (“The
central objective behind the system of contract remedies is compensatory, not punitive.”);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2017) (“The purpose[ ] of awarding contract damages is to compensate the injured party.”).
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the expenses the buyer has incurred,173 the presence of an expense
reimbursement provision174 along with the fact that the termination fee is much larger than the allowed expenses can strengthen
the argument that the termination fee is unreasonable.175 More
generally, one of the concerns of allowing liquidated damages that
are too large is that it can lead to allocative inefficiency.176 While
an evenhanded competition better promotes allocative efficiency,
a termination fee that is substantially larger than the expenses
incurred can impede that objective. Another factor may be the

173

See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 48–49:

[The termination fee took into account] (a) the lost opportunity costs associated
with a contract to deal exclusively with each other; (b) the expenses incurred
during the course of negotiating the transaction; (c) the likelihood of a higher bid
emerging for the acquisition of either party; and (d) the size of termination fees
in other merger transactions.
See also Nexstar-Tribune Merger Agreement, supra note 91, § 9.3(c), at 79; supra Part II.A
(discussing the agreement).
174 See ABA MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT, supra note 88, § 7.3, at 276. For instance,
when the deal fails to close because the target consummates a deal with a different buyer
or the target board changes its recommendation, the buyer is entitled to very generous
expense reimbursement from the target. Section 7.3(a)(ii) states:
Company shall make a nonrefundable cash payment to Parent, in an amount
equal to the aggregate amount of all fees and expenses (including all attorneys’
fees, accountants’ fees, financial advisory fees and filing fees) that have been paid
or that may become payable by or on behalf of Parent in connection with the
preparation and negotiation of this Agreement and otherwise in connection with
the Merger (the “Expense Reimbursement”) if this Agreement is terminated
(A) by Parent or the Company pursuant to Section 7.1(b) and on or before the
date of any such termination, an Acquisition Proposal shall have been publicly
announced or disclosed or an Acquisition Proposal has otherwise been communicated to the Company Board, or (B) by Parent or the Company pursuant to
Section 7.1(d) or (C) by Parent pursuant to either Section 7.1(e) or Section 7.1(f).
Id. § 7.3(a)(ii), at 276 (emphasis added).
175 An important consideration here is that when the target is sold to a different
buyer, the initial buyer no longer has an option to try to execute the deal again in the
future. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
176 One of the economic justifications of expectation damages is that it facilitates allocative efficiency (the “efficient breach theory”): a contract will be breached when doing
so will generate more surplus. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages,
Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and
a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 558–59 (1977). But, the theory is
usually based on the assumption that a contracting party gets to make a onetime breach
decision and that there is no subsequent competition among the buyers, as in an auction.
Once there is an auction, on the other hand, allocative efficiency is much more likely to be
achieved and the goal of damages is to create a more even playing field among the interested buyers. This would be more feasible with reliance damages (such as expense reimbursement) than with expectation damages or any liquidated damages that are substantially larger than reliance damages.
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market conditions or the target’s bargaining power.177 When the
acquisition market is very seller friendly or when the target is in
a strong bargaining position, so that the deal price is close to the
inside buyer’s reservation value, imposing even a moderate termination fee can generate allocative inefficiency.178 At the opposite end of the spectrum, when the target is in a weak bargaining
posture or the market is very buyer friendly, even a relatively
large termination fee will not generate an inefficiency. In short,
instead of concluding that a breakup fee of a certain percentage
of the deal price (e.g., 3% or 5%) is reasonable across the board,
that reasonableness determination should depend on a case-bycase analysis that looks at several different factors, such as
whether a generous expense reimbursement provision is also
present, and whether the target enjoyed a strong bargaining position against the buyer.
For a match right, since the right does not deal with the issue
of compensation, the core concern, rather, is whether the right
imposes an unreasonable restraint on trade. As we saw earlier,
however, an unlimited match right, compared to a limited match
right, is more likely to lower the outside buyer’s expected return
but, at the same time, to increase the chances that the target will
be sold to the buyer with a higher valuation. From an efficiency
perspective, it is the limited match right that is more likely to
impose constraint and perhaps should be more subject to judicial
scrutiny under contract law.179 An unlimited match right, by contrast, does not, in general, unreasonably restrain trade (i.e., competition for the target among inside and outside buyers). In sum,
while both termination fees and unlimited match rights are likely

177 More precisely, as shown earlier, allocative inefficiency will result when the size
of the termination fee is larger than the expected surplus from the deal for the initial
buyer. See supra Part III.A.
178 One can think of termination fees as a “price” term in a contract—in this case, the
price to walk away from the deal. When bargaining power shifts from one party to another,
such a price term is most likely to be affected by that shift. See Albert Choi & George
Triantis, The Effect of Bargaining Power on Contract Design, 98 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1678–
79 (2012) (analyzing the impact of a shift in bargaining power on both price and non-price
terms in a contract); see also Badawi & de Fontenay, supra note 54, at 1154 (examining
the impact of being the first drafter on various deal provisions).
179 This depends on our conception of “restraint of trade.” Given that a limited match
right hampers the inside buyer’s competitive standing vis-à-vis outside buyers, one could
conceptualize it as something akin to a noncompete agreement, although, of course, the
analogy is not exact since a noncompete clause kicks in after the initial relationship has
been terminated.
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to reduce an outside buyer’s expected return, unlimited match
rights facilitate allocative efficiency while termination fees do not.
TABLE 4: CONTRACT LAW IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENT
DEAL PROTECTION DEVICES

Small
Termination Fee
Large
Termination Fee
Limited Match
Right
Unlimited Match
Right

Possible
“Unreasonable”
Restraint of Trade?

Possible
Overcompensation of
Disappointed Buyer?

No

No

Yes

Yes

Unlikely180

No

No

No

CONCLUSION
Deal protection devices provide more confidence to the buyer
that the deal will close and have been in the mergers and acquisitions landscape for quite some time. Notwithstanding earlier judicial hostility against certain deal protection devices, particularly during the hostile takeover era of the 1980s and early 1990s,
courts recently have been much more willing to validate deal protection measures, particularly termination fees and match rights.
In an influential opinion, for instance, then–Delaware Vice Chancellor Leo Strine has called them “common contractual” features.181 While most deal protection devices have been scrutinized
within the frame of target directors’ fiduciary duties, most recently, in the midst of heated controversy over whether courts
should use the deal price as an indicator of fair value in an appraisal proceeding, the Delaware Court of Chancery has pointed
to the presence of such devices as undermining the usefulness of
the deal price as relevant evidence.
This Article has examined some of these issues, with a particular focus on whether deal protection devices will be detrimental to the target shareholders and whether the presence of
such provisions should steer courts away from using deal price as
180
181

See supra note 161.
See In re Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 1017; see also Part I.A.
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evidence of fair value in appraisal proceedings. Applying simple
auction theory, this Article has shown that deal protection devices
can, under certain conditions, function as a contractual externality
mechanism that allows the contracting parties to realize a higher
joint return by extracting rent from a noncontracting party. While
both match rights and termination fees can function as rent extraction mechanisms, their incidence and effect can differ. An unlimited match right, compared to a limited match right, will do
better not only in enhancing the target’s return but also in making sure that the target is sold to the buyer with the higher valuation. By comparison, a termination fee, without any price concession from the buyer, will reduce the target’s return and also
impede the target from being sold to the buyer with the higher
valuation. While an unlimited match right may not require a corresponding price concession from the buyer to increase the target’s
return, a termination fee does. While the primary focus of this
Article has been on termination fees and match rights, this Article also deployed auction theory to examine other deal protection
devices, notably stock and asset lockups.
Properly utilized, deal protection devices can enhance the return for the target shareholders. Improperly used, they can (substantially) undercut target shareholders’ interests. Therefore,
whether they enhance the target shareholders’ interests depends
on the motives and the behavior of the target directors and managers who are agreeing to such mechanisms. This Article argues
that when the incentives of target directors and managers are
well aligned with those of the shareholders, not only can the deal
protection devices increase the target shareholders’ welfare, the
deal price can also be a more reliable indicator (compared to a
case that does not have any deal protection measures) of fair
value. At the opposite end, not only can deal protection devices
substantially destroy target shareholders’ value, their presence
can undercut the evidentiary value of the deal price as fair value.
Finally, this Article argues that, even when the agents are
properly discharging their duties, unreasonable deal protection
measures can engender inefficiency and should be scrutinized under contract law for possibly being against public policy. Particularly when the target corporation has agreed to reimburse the
buyer’s (out-of-pocket) expenses in case the deal falls apart, or
when the target enjoys a strong bargaining position, a generous
termination fee should trigger stronger scrutiny by courts for its
potentially harmful public policy implications.

